BYU Law Review
Volume 2010 | Issue 5

Article 5

11-1-2010

Reconsidering the Georgia-Pacific Standard for
Reasonable Royalty Patent Damages
Christopher B. Seaman

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Christopher B. Seaman, Reconsidering the Georgia-Pacific Standard for Reasonable Royalty Patent Damages, 2010 BYU L. Rev. 1661
(2010).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2010/iss5/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

DO NOT DELETE

2/16/2011 12:58 PM

Reconsidering the Georgia-Pacific Standard
for Reasonable Royalty Patent Damages
Christopher B. Seaman*
ABSTRACT
Determining damages for infringement is one of the most
important—and controversial—issues in patent litigation. The current
fifteen-factor Georgia-Pacific standard for determining a reasonable
royalty has become increasingly difficult for juries to apply in patent
disputes involving complex, high-technology products, resulting in
unpredictable damage awards that tend to overcompensate patentees.
This Article proposes a more manageable alternative to GeorgiaPacific when an acceptable noninfringing substitute for the patented
technology exists. Specifically, in a hypothetical bargain for a patent
license, both economic and negotiation theory explain that a rational
patent licensor would agree to pay only the costs it would incur to adopt
and implement a noninfringing substitute technology, plus any lost
benefits related to the substitute’s use. Indeed, the Federal Circuit
already has recognized an analogous limitation on damages in the
context of lost profits, although it has defined the universe of
alternatives too narrowly by refusing to consider imperfect substitutes
for the patented technology.
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Reconsidering the Georgia-Pacific Standard
I. INTRODUCTION

Determining damages for infringement is one of the most
important—and controversial—issues in current patent litigation.1
Jury verdicts of over $100 million have become almost
commonplace in the past few years:2
 In February 2007, Lucent was awarded $1.53 billion against
Microsoft as a reasonable royalty for infringement of two
patents used in the MP3 audio compression format;3
 In February 2008, Dr. Bruce Saffran was awarded $501
million against Boston Scientific as a reasonable royalty for
infringement of a patent covering drug-eluting stent
technology;4

1. See, e.g., PETER S. MENELL ET AL., PATENT CASE MANAGEMENT JUDICIAL GUIDE §
7.3.4.7 (2009) (“One of the most vexing issues in patent law today relates to the proper
measure of damages.”); Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A Structured Approach to
Calculating Reasonable Royalties, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 627, 628 (2010) (“The
calculation of patent damages has become one of the most contentious issues in all of
intellectual property (IP) law.”); Michael H. King & Steven M. Evans, Selecting an
Appropriate Damages Expert in a Patent Case: An Examination of the Current Status of
Daubert, 38 AKRON L. REV. 357, 357 (2005) (“The determination of damages is a critical part
of any patent case.”).
2. See, e.g., Jerry A. Hausman, Gregory K. Leonard & J. Gregory Sidak, Patent
Damages and Real Options: How Judicial Characterization of Noninfringing Alternatives
Reduces Incentives to Innovate, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 825, 827 (2007) (“Jury awards [for
patent infringement] exceeding $100 million were relatively rare before 1990 but now are
common.”).
Notably, this list does not include cases settled in the face of potential damage
awards of similar magnitude. See, e.g., Press Release, Broadcom.com, Qualcomm and
Broadcom Reach Settlement and Patent Agreement (Apr. 26, 2009), available at
http://www.broadcom.com/ press/release.php?id=s379764 (settlement of $891 million for
patent litigation regarding cellular chips); Press Release, Research in Motion, Ltd., Research in
Motion and NTP Sign Definitive Settlement Agreement to End Litigation (Mar. 3, 2006),
available at http://press.rim.com/release.jsp?id=981 (settlement for $612.5 million regarding
wireless email patents in the face of a permanent injunction).
3. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 509 F. Supp. 2d 912 (S.D. Cal. 2007), aff’d
on other grounds, 543 F.3d 710 (Fed. Cir. 2008). After trial, the district court granted
Microsoft’s motion for judgment as a matter of law and/or motion for a new trial regarding
damages on several grounds, including misapplication of the so-called “entire market value
rule.” Id. at 935–40.
4. Final Judgment, Saffran v. Boston Sci., Corp., No. 2:05-CV-547 (TJW) (E.D. Tex.
Feb. 2, 2008), motion for new trial on damages denied, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52561 (E.D.
Tex. July 9, 2008).
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 In April 2008, Lucent was awarded another $358 million
against Microsoft—raised to $511 million after prejudgment
interest—as a reasonable royalty for infringement of a patent
on a date-picking feature utilized by Microsoft Outlook;5
 In June 2008, Cornell University was awarded $184 million
against Hewlett-Packard as a reasonable royalty for
infringement of a patent regarding computer instructionprocessing techniques;6
 In April 2009, Uniloc was awarded $388 million against
Microsoft as a reasonable royalty for infringement of a patent
about technology designed to deter software piracy;7
 In May 2009, i4i Limited Partnership was awarded $200
million against Microsoft as a reasonable royalty for
infringement of a patent regarding custom XML encoding in
Microsoft Word,8 a feature that was “used by only a small
fraction of Microsoft’s customers”;9
 In June 2009, Centocor, a Johnson & Johnson subsidiary,
was awarded $1.67 billion—including $504 million as a
reasonable royalty—against Abbott Laboratories for
infringement of a patent on a drug for autoimmune
diseases;10
 In August 2009, Versata Software was awarded $138 million
against SAP as a reasonable royalty for infringement of two

5. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F. Supp. 2d 1016 (S.D. Cal. 2008),
vacated and remanded, 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
6. Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 279, 282 (N.D.N.Y. 2009).
After trial, the district court reduced the judgment amount to approximately $53 million. Id.
at 291–92.
7. Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 640 F. Supp. 2d 150 (D.R.I. 2009), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part, and remanded, No. 2010-1035, 2011 WL 9738 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 4, 2011).
This award was vacated by the district court in September 2009 when it granted judgment as a
matter of law of noninfringement for Microsoft. Id. at 154, 161–76.
8. i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 670 F. Supp. 2d 568 (E.D. Tex. 2009), aff’d,
598 F.3d 831 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 79 U.S.L.W. 3128 (U.S. Nov. 29, 2010) (No.
10-290).
9. i4i, 598 F.3d at 862.
10. Verdict Form, Centocor Ortho Biotech Inc. v. Abbott Labs., No. 07-CV-139-TWJ
(E.D. Tex. June 29, 2009), available at http://thepriorart.typepad.com/files/
centocor.abbott.verdict.form.pdf. The remaining $1.168 billion was awarded as lost profits. Id.
This is the largest verdict in the history of U.S. patent litigation. The Plaintiff’s Hot List, NAT’L
L.J., Oct. 5, 2009, at S8.
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patents on methods for pricing products in multilevel
product and organization groups;11
 In March 2010, VirnetX was awarded $105 million against
Microsoft as a reasonable royalty for infringement of two
patents related to virtual private networks (“VPN”) between
computers;12 and
 In October 2010, Mirror Worlds was awarded a total of
$625.5 million as a reasonable royalty against Apple for
infringement of three patents—$208.5 million per patent—
by Apple’s computers and mobile devices.13

In addition, methods for calculating damages have become a
primary stumbling block for patent reform legislation, which has
languished in Congress since 2005.14
This Article argues that the current “gold standard” for awarding
reasonable royalty damages15—the so-called Georgia-Pacific16 test—
has become increasingly difficult for juries to apply in lengthy and
complex patent trials, resulting in unpredictable damage awards.17

11. Verdict Form, Versata Software, Inc. v. SAP Am., No. 2:07-CV-153 (E.D. Tex.
Aug. 26, 2009).
12. Verdict Form, VirnetX Holding Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 6:07-CV-80 (E.D.
Tex. Mar. 16, 2010). This litigation was subsequently settled for $200 million in May 2010.
Press Release, Microsoft Corp., Microsoft and VirnetX Settle Patent Infringement Cases (May
17, 2010), available at http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/2010/may10/0517newspr.mspx.
13. Verdict Form, Mirror Worlds, LLC v. Apple, Inc., No. 6:08-CV-88 (E.D. Tex. Oct.
1, 2010).
14. Durie & Lemley, supra note 1, at 628; see also Damages Provisions of the Patent
Reform Act, LAW360, May 28, 2009, http://www.law360.com/articles/99166 (explaining
that “[p]erhaps no effort has been more contentious than that directed toward changing the
damages provision of the patent statute”); George Best, Benjamin Berkowitz & Stephen
Maebius, How Damaged Is the Patent Reform Act? Dispute Over How to Calculate Awards Is
Just the Latest IP Debate Slowing Down This Bill, LEGAL TIMES, July 7, 2008, at 16, available
at 2008 WLNR 27111257 (noting that the Patent Reform Act “is being held up, in large part,
by a dispute over proposed changes to the statute governing damage awards for patent
infringement”).
15. Durie & Lemley, supra note 1, at 628.
16. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y.
1970).
17. See F. Russell Denton, Rolling Equilibriums at the Pre-Commons Frontier:
Identifying Patently Efficient Royalties for Complex Products, 14 VA. J.L. & TECH. 48, 83–84
(2009) (arguing that “[t]he myriad of possibilities for parties to . . . cherry-pick [from Georgia-

1665

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2/16/2011 12:58 PM

2010

The Georgia-Pacific test, developed almost forty years ago by a
district court and subsequently adopted by the Federal Circuit,18
identifies fifteen factors for the jury to consider in a so-called
“hypothetical negotiation” between the patentee and the accused
infringer.19 These factors involve a wide variety of technical, financial,
licensing, and other issues. Furthermore, they are nonexclusive,
meaning that the jury may consider any relevant information that
does not fall within a particular factor.20 Finally, courts have refused
to mandate any method for weighing these factors, thus permitting
the parties, their damages experts, and the jury to pick and choose
which factors they consider more or less important in any given
case.21 As a result, it is unsurprising that Georgia-Pacific has been
criticized as giving juries “little useful guidance”22 in determining a
reasonable royalty.
Indeed, there is a growing body of evidence that Georgia-Pacific
has resulted in the systematic overcompensation of patent owners in
certain industries.23 Moreover, the wide latitude given to juries in
evaluating the Georgia-Pacific factors makes it difficult for courts to
review reasonable royalty awards to determine if they are supported

Pacific’s] constellation of fifteen separate factors probably doomed the reproducibility of
outcomes from the outset”).
18. See, e.g., Unisplay, S.A. v. Am. Elec. Sign Co., 69 F.3d 512, 517 n.7 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (stating that “[a] comprehensive list of relevant factors in determining a reasonable
royalty is set out in Georgia-Pacific”); Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc., 718 F.2d 1075,
1077 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (affirming reasonable royalty award based on trial court’s application of
Georgia-Pacific).
19. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1324–25 (Fed. Cir. 2009);
Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1554 n.13 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc).
20. See, e.g., Micro Chemical, Inc. v. Lextron, Inc., 317 F.3d 1387, 1393 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (stating that factors considered in the reasonable royalty analysis “include those set out
in Georgia-Pacific”).
21. See Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120–21 (“[T]here is no formula by which
these [fifteen] factors can be rated precisely in the order of their relative importance or by
which their economic significance can be automatically transduced into their pecuniary
equivalent.”).
22. S. REP. NO. 110-259, at 11–12 (2008).
23. Mark A. Lemley, Distinguishing Lost Profits from Reasonable Royalties, 51 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 655, 667 (2009); see also H.R. REP. NO. 110-314, at 26 (2008) (finding that
“current litigation practices often produce a royalty award substantially in excess of a
reasonable royalty”).
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by substantial evidence.24 This is particularly problematic because a
reasonable royalty recently has become the most commonly
employed method for calculating patent infringement damages,
supplementing or replacing the traditional remedy of the patentee’s
lost profits.25
This Article offers an alternative standard for calculating a
reasonable royalty when there is an acceptable substitute to the
patented technology. Specifically, it proposes that a reasonable
royalty for patent infringement should not exceed the accused
infringer’s expected costs of adopting an acceptable noninfringing
substitute. This standard is based on the economic principle of
substitutability: a rational actor will not pay more for a particular
good or service when a lower-cost replacement is available. This
standard is also supported by negotiation theory, which explains that
a rational negotiator would not agree to an outcome that would be
worse than the next-best available alternative if no deal was reached.
As a result, when an acceptable substitute to the patented technology
exists, a rational accused infringer would pay only the amount that it
would cost to obtain (or internally develop) and implement the
substitute technology, as well as any lost profits or other costs
incurred due to the substitute’s adoption. In fact, the Federal Circuit
has already recognized an analogous limitation on damages in the
context of lost profits.26
Part II of this Article discusses the history of a reasonable royalty
prior to Georgia-Pacific, including early cases’ consideration of
acceptable noninfringing substitutes. Part III explains the current
regime for calculating patent damages, including the relative decline
of lost profits as a basis for recovery compared to a reasonable royalty
under the Georgia-Pacific standard. Part IV explains why GeorgiaPacific’s application in modern patent trials is problematic,
24. See also Durie & Lemley, supra note 1, at 632–35 (finding that overwhelming
majority of courts affirm the reasonable royalty number selected by the jury).
25. See ARON LEVKO, 2009 PATENT DAMAGES STUDY: PRELIMINARY RESULTS, slide 9
(Feb. 11, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/workshops/ipmarketplace/feb11/
docs/alevko.pdf (finding that since 1999, 54% of damages awards were calculated based on a
reasonable royalty, compared to 40% based on lost profits).
26. See, e.g., SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Labs. Corp., 926 F.2d 1161, 1165
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (stating that to recover lost profits, a patentee must establish, inter alia,
“absence of an acceptable, non-infringing substitute for the patented product” (citing Panduit
Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, 575 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir. 1978))).
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particularly those involving complex, high-technology products that
may practice numerous patents. Finally, Part V contends that the
cost of adopting an acceptable noninfringing substitute should serve
as a ceiling on a reasonable royalty award. Part V also addresses
potential concerns that such a ceiling would result in the
undercompensation of patentees by granting a “free option” to
infringe.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF REASONABLE ROYALTIES FOR
PATENT INFRINGEMENT
A. Recognizing Reasonable Royalties as a Measure of Damages
Before 1915, courts generally rejected the idea of a reasonable
royalty for patent infringement.27 Instead, the “chief measure” of a
patentee’s damages was “an established royalty rate from actual
licenses” for the patent-in-suit.28 For example, in Rude v. Westcott,29
the Supreme Court held that damages for infringement did not
include a reasonable royalty for the patented technology.30 In that
case, the plaintiffs—assignees of the original patentee31—sought
royalties for the two patents-in-suit, which claimed an improved drill
for seeding machines.32 The Court rejected plaintiffs’ claim for an

27. JOHN M. SKENYON, CHRISTOPHER S. MARCHESE & JOHN LAND, PATENT
DAMAGES LAW AND PRACTICE § 3:9 (2009).
28. Id.; see also Clark v. Wooster, 119 U.S. 322, 326 (1886) (“It is a general rule in
patent causes that established license fees are the best measure of damages that can be used.”);
Faulkner v. Gibbs, 199 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir. 1952) (“Where an established royalty for a
license is proved, this is the best measure of the value of what was taken by the
infringement.”).
29. 130 U.S. 152 (1889).
30. Id. at 166–67.
31. Id. at 162–63.
32. Id. at 163–64. The plaintiffs-assignees “waived all claim for [lost] profits arising
from the manufacture, use and sale of the patented machines” because “no machines”
embodying the patented technology “had been manufactured and put on the market by the
patentee[] or . . . his assignees.” Id. at 163, 167.
Interestingly, the assignment in Rude provided that the patentee granted the
plaintiffs-assignees the right to “demand, sue for and receive” licensing fees against “all and
any person whomsoever, who may have been, or may be, manufacturing or selling said drills
containing the [patented] improvements.” Id. at 156. The patentee would receive 25% of the
“sales, royalties, or settlements” obtained by the plaintiffs, after deducting litigation and
licensing costs. Id. at 157–58. Thus, the plaintiffs in Rude appear to be an early type of nonpracticing entity—also called a “patent troll”—that “purchased or licensed the patents at issue
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established royalty, finding that the two licenses identified did not
“establish a market price” for the patented technology.33 In addition,
it concluded that the plaintiffs could not recover a “reasonable and
fair royalty” for the alleged infringement.34 During a proceeding
before a special master on damages, plaintiffs offered testimony from
several witnesses “to estimate the value” of the patents.35
Defendants, in turn, argued that no royalty should be awarded
because there were acceptable noninfringing substitutes for the
patented technology.36 Ultimately, the Court rejected the claim for a
reasonable royalty, holding that plaintiffs’ “conjectural estimates” of
the patents’ value did not offer a legally cognizable basis for
damages.37
In 1915, however, the Supreme Court sanctioned a “reasonable
royalty” as an appropriate measure of patent infringement damages.
In Dowagiac Manufacturing Co. v. Minnesota Moline Plow Co.,38
which involved litigation over a patent for an improved grain drill,
the plaintiff was unable to prove any lost profits due to defendants’
infringement.39 In addition, the Court held “there was no
established royalty” because the plaintiff had maintained the patent

from another . . . solely for the purpose of licensing [the] patented technology.” RICHARD F.
CAULEY, WINNING THE PATENT DAMAGES CASE: A LITIGATOR’S GUIDE TO ECONOMIC
MODELS AND OTHER DAMAGE STRATEGIES 20 (2009); see also John R. Allison, Mark A.
Lemley & Joshua Walker, Extreme Value or Trolls on Top? The Characteristics of the MostLitigated Patents, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 24 (2009) (describing “nonpracticing entities” as
including “licensing companies in the business of buying up and enforcing patents (‘trolls’ by
virtually anyone’s definition)”).
33. Rude, 130 U.S. at 163–65 (“Sales of licenses, made at periods years apart, will not
establish any rule on the subject and determine the value of the patent.”).
34. Id. at 166.
35. Id.
36. See id. (offering testimony from defense witnesses—who had examined and used
drills embodying the patented technology—“that they did not consider [the patented drills] of
any more utility than other seeding drills in use, and that [the patented drills] did not bring
any greater price in the market”).
37. Id. at 167 (holding that the special master’s reasonable royalty violated “a settled
rule of law . . . that actual, not speculative, damages must be shown, and by clear and definite
proof, to warrant a recovery for the infringement of a patent”).
38. 235 U.S. 641, 648 (1915).
39. Id.
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as a “close monopoly” by refusing to license it.40 Nevertheless, the
Court held that in such situations, the plaintiff could “show the
value by proving what would have been a reasonable royalty” for the
patent.41 It explained that
[i]f there had been an established royalty, the jury could have
taken that sum as the measure of damages. In the absence of
such royalty, and in the absence of proof of lost sales or
injury by competition, the only measure of damages was such
sum as, under all the circumstances, would have been a
reasonable royalty for the defendant to have paid.42
The Dowagiac court concluded that a reasonable royalty should
be determined in light of “the nature of the invention, its utility and
advantages, and the extent of the use involved.”43 As John Schlicher
has explained, this meant a reasonable royalty “should be based on
the utility and advantages this invention provided beyond those
available from use of the next best alternative.”44 Consequently,
“[t]he Court was requiring that the royalty measure be set based on
the marginal value of the invention” over any substitutes.45
In 1922, Congress amended the patent laws46 to codify the
Dowagiac decision and authorize the recovery of a reasonable royalty
for patent infringement.47 If a patentee suffered damages that were
“not susceptible of calculation and determination with reasonable
certainty,” such as lost profits or an established royalty, the 1922 Act
40. Id. (holding that if plaintiff had “grant[ed] licenses to others to deal in articles
embodying the invention, the established royalty could have been proved as indicative of the
value of what was taken, and therefore as affording a basis for measuring the damages”).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 649 (quoting Hunt Bros. Fruit-Packing Co. v. Cassiday, 64 F. 585, 587 (9th
Cir. 1894)); see also U.S. Frumentum Co. v. Lauhoff, 216 F. 610 (6th Cir. 1914) (holding
that in “instances where no market value [for the patent] existed and where no loss or
impairment of sales can be definitely proved,” the patentee can still recover “a ‘reasonable
royalty’”).
43. Dowagiac, 235 U.S. at 648.
44. John W. Schlicher, Measuring Patent Damages by the Market Value of Inventions—
The Grain Processing, Rite-Hite, and Aro Rules, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 503,
509 (2000).
45. Id.
46. Act of Feb. 18, 1922, Pub. L. No. 67-147, § 8, 42 Stat. 389, 392 [hereinafter
“1922 Act”].
47. See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 243 F. Supp. 500, 519–20
(S.D.N.Y. 1965) (“The reasonable royalty was written into the 1922 statute . . . .”).
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allowed courts to “adjudge and decree the payment by the defendant
to the complainant of a reasonable sum as . . . general damages for
the infringement.”48 The 1922 Act also permitted the patentee to
present “competent and admissible” evidence in support of a
reasonable royalty, including expert and opinion testimony at the
court’s discretion.49
In 1946, the patent statute was further amended to explicitly
declare that “a reasonable royalty” was available to determine
damages,50 aiding a plaintiff who was unable (or unwilling) to
establish them by other means, such as lost profits. Specifically, the
1946 Act provided that upon a judgment of infringement, the
patentee “shall be entitled to recover general damages which shall be
due compensation for making, using, or selling the invention, not less
than a reasonable royalty therefor, together with such costs, and
interest, as may be fixed by the court.”51 As a result, a reasonable
royalty became the minimum measure of damages for infringement.
The 1952 Patent Act,52 which remains in force today, made only
minor changes to the 1946 Act’s damages provisions. The relevant
portion of this Act, currently embodied in 35 U.S.C. § 284, provides
that a patentee may recover “damages adequate to compensate for
the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for

48. § 8, 42 Stat. at 392.
49. Id.
50. Act of Aug. 1, 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-587, 60 Stat. 778 (hereinafter “1946 Act”);
see also Note, Recovery in Patent Infringement Suits, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 840, 848 (1960)
(explaining that after the 1946 Act, “[a] reasonable royalty is now always awarded to
compensate for the whole or any part of an infringement not compensated by other measures
of damages” (footnotes omitted)).
51. 60 Stat. at 778 (emphasis added). The 1946 Act, like the 1922 Act, permitted
expert or opinion testimony on the amount of a reasonable royalty. Id. The 1946 Act also
removed the 1922 Act’s provision that a plaintiff should be entitled to “profits to be accounted
for by the defendant”—i.e., disgorgement of the infringer’s own profits due to his
misconduct—in addition to the plaintiff’s own damages. Compare § 8, 42 Stat. at 392, with 60
Stat. at 778. The Supreme Court explained the distinction between “profits” and “damages”
for patent infringement by stating that “[i]n patent nomenclature[,] what the infringer makes
is ‘profits’; what the owner of the patent loses by such infringement is ‘damages.’” Duplace
Corp. v. Triplex Safety Glass Co., 298 U.S. 448, 451 (1936) (quoting Diamond Stone-Sawing
Mach. Co. v. Brown, 166 F. 306 (2d Cir. 1908)). The elimination of “profits” in the 1946
Act was intended “to eliminate the recovery of [the infringer’s] profits as such and allow
recovery of damages only.” Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476,
505 (1964).
52. Act of July 19, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82–593, 66 Stat. 812.
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the use made of the invention by the infringer.”53 The legislative
history of the 1952 Act indicates that no substantive changes were
intended by this alteration in language.54
B. Noninfringing Substitutes Before Georgia-Pacific
In calculating a reasonable royalty, several pre-Georgia-Pacific
decisions considered the value of the patented technology in light of
potential noninfringing substitutes. These decisions explained that
courts must evaluate the “utility and advantages” of an invention
over existing products or methods for accomplishing the same
objective.55 For instance, in B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Consolidated Rubber
Tire Co.,56 the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s
reasonable royalty for infringement of a patent for improved rubber
tires, based in large part on widespread recognition that the patented
tire had become the “standard rubber tire” and was superior to any
available alternative.57
Likewise, in Activated Sludge, Inc. v. Sanitary District of
Chicago,58 the district court extensively considered the “character of
the inventions, their utility, their history, [and] their practicability
and advantages,” including the patent’s “usefulness and commercial
value reflected by their advantages over other devices or processes,”

53. Id. The following sentence was added at the end of the second paragraph by Pub. L.
No. 106-113, § 1000(a)(9): “Increased damages under this paragraph shall not apply to
provisional rights under section 154(d) of this title.” 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000). This
amendment has no relevance to this Article’s analysis.
54. See S. REP. NO. 82-1979 (1952); H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923 (1952); 98 CONG. REC.
9097 (1952); see also Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 243 F. Supp. 500, 521
(S.D.N.Y. 1965) (“[T]he 1952 codification was not intended to make substantive
modifications in the provisions relating to recovery . . . .”).
55. See, e.g., Enter. Mfg. Co. v. Shakespeare Co., 141 F.2d 916, 920 (6th Cir. 1944);
Dunkley Co. v. Cent. Cal. Canneries, 7 F.2d 972 (9th Cir. 1925); see also Hartford Nat’l Bank
& Trust Co. v. E.F. Drew & Co., 188 F. Supp. 353, 359 (D. Del. 1960) (considering the
“nature of the invention, its utility, [and] its novelty over and advance in the art” as relevant
factors in determining a reasonable royalty).
56. 251 F. 617 (7th Cir. 1918).
57. See id. at 623 (recounting testimony that “‘[f]ew patents have received such
immediate and well-nigh unanimous recognition. It is the standard rubber tire of today,’” that
the patented tire “‘has been accepted as the termination of the struggle for a completely
successful tire,’” and that it “‘established, and has ever since maintained, its supremacy over all
other rubber tires’”).
58. 64 F. Supp. 25 (N.D. Ill. 1946).
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in determining a reasonable royalty.59 The patent at issue, which
claimed an activated sludge process for treating and purifying
sewage, was identified as the “most desirable” and “‘best adapted’
type of artificial sewage treatment” available, and that “no method
has been found . . . which is as well suited to the requirements of the
sewage treatment problem as the [patented] activated sludge
process.”60 After an extensive analysis, the district court found that
the available alternative identified by defendant was “inferior to that
of activated sludge” and that the “undisputed advantages” of the
patented process were “beyond question” and “must enter into the
determination by this court of what is just compensation for invasion
of plaintiffs’ rights.”61
III. THE CURRENT DAMAGES REGIME
This Part explains how lost profits, once the dominant method
for determining patent damages, has become less common than a
reasonable royalty award based on a so-called “hypothetical
negotiation” between the patentee and infringer for a license to the
patented technology. Today, nearly all reasonable royalty awards are
based on the fifteen-factor test adopted in the district court’s 1970
decision in Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp.62 As
explained below, however, the Georgia-Pacific case dramatically
differs from modern patent infringement litigation in several
important ways.
A. The Relative Decline of Lost Profits
As previously explained, under the current patent damages
statute, 35 U.S.C. § 284, a patentee shall recover “damages
adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less
than a reasonable royalty” for the defendants’ infringing use. Courts
have interpreted this language to conclude that patent damages can
be determined using several different methods.

59. Id. at 27.
60. Id. at 30.
61. Id. at 30–31; see also id. at 29–30 (describing the alternative “Imhoff trickling filter
process”).
62. 318 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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The first method is lost profits, which is a remedy for patent
owners who can establish that the infringement deprived them of
profits that they otherwise would have earned.63 From an economic
perspective, “the purpose of a lost profits damages award in a patent
case is to compensate the patent holder for the profits on sales that it
lost as a result of the infringement.”64 The classic example of lost
profits is diverted sales—that is, profits the patentee would have
made from sales of goods or services but for the infringer’s wrongful
conduct.65 Lost profits may also arise from price erosion, where
competition by the infringer causes the patentee to reduce its prices
and thus earn less profit on the goods or services that it did sell.66
Other potential theories of recovery under the umbrella of lost
profits can include increased expenditures in advertising or marketing
to correct the harm to the patentee’s market position caused by the
infringement;67 future lost profits due to the continuing harm caused
by past infringement;68 and—more controversially—damages for socalled “convoyed sales,” which are lost sales of goods that are not

63. See SKENYON ET AL., supra note 27, § 1.7 (“The patent owner may recover its lost
profits . . . if the patent owner can prove that the infringement caused the patent owner to lose
profits that it otherwise would have made.”); see also BIC Leisure Prods., Inc. v. Windsurfing
Int’l, Inc., 1 F.3d 1214, 1218 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“[A] patent owner must prove a causal
relation between the infringement and its loss of profits.”).
64. Hausman, Leonard & Sidak, supra note 2, at 833.
65. See, e.g., Micro Chem., Inc. v. Lextron, Inc., 318 F.3d 1119, 1124 (Fed. Cir.
2003); State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
66. Lam, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 718 F.2d 1056, 1065 (Fed. Cir. 1983);
SKENYON ET AL., supra note 27, § 2.4 (“Price erosion damages are awarded when the patent
owner establishes that its sales during the infringing period were made at prices below what
they would have been absent infringement.”); see also Yale Lock Mfg. Co. v. Sargent, 117 U.S.
536, 551 (1886) (“Reduction of prices, and consequent loss of profits, enforced by infringing
competition, is a proper ground for awarding damages.”) (quoting Sargent v. Yale Lock Mfg.
Co., 21 F. Cas. 507, 508 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1879) (No. 12,366)).
67. Lam, 718 F.2d at 1065; see also Scripto-Tokai Corp. v. Gillette Co., 788 F. Supp.
439, 444 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (explaining that “increased expenses for advertising and
promotion” can be part of lost profits).
68. Oiness v. Walgreen Co., 88 F.3d 1025, 1031 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see also Christopher
S. Marchese, Patent Infringement and Future Lost Profits Damages, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 747
(1994). But see Brooktree Corp. v. Adv. Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 1581 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (rejecting the patentee’s claim of future lost profits due to “the uncertainties of future
pricing, future competition, and future markets” in the “fast-moving field” of
semiconductors).
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covered by the patent-in-suit, but that are typically sold in
connection with the patented good or service.69
The most common way to establish lost profits under § 284 is
the four-factor test first articulated by the Sixth Circuit in Panduit
Corp. v. Stahlin Brothers Fibre Works, Inc.70 “To recover lost profits
under the Panduit test, ‘the patent owner must prove (1) a demand
for the patented product, (2) an absence of acceptable noninfringing
substitutes, (3) the manufacturing and marketing capability to
exploit the demand, and (4) the amount of profit the patent owner
would have made.’”71
However, successful claims for lost profits are becoming less
common as “courts have insisted on strict standards of proof for
entitlement to lost profits.”72 Moreover, lost profits are unavailable
unless the patentee directly competes with the infringer, such as by
selling its own product that practices the patent.73 As a result,
nonpracticing entities—which file a substantial number of
infringement suits74—generally cannot recover damages for lost
profits because they do not manufacture or sell their own products.75

69. See Am. Seating Co. v. USSC Group, Inc., 514 F.3d 1262, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(“A patentee may recover lost profits on unpatented components sold with a patented item, a
convoyed sale, if both the patented and unpatented products ‘together were considered to be
components of a single assembly or parts of a complete machine, or they together constituted a
functional unit.’”) (quoting Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1550 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (en banc)); see also Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Rethinking Patent Damages, 10
TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 85–93 (2001) (critically evaluating the economic basis for
recovering lost profits damages for unpatented complementary goods).
70. 575 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1978); see also Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1545 (stating that the
Panduit test has “since been accepted” by the Federal Circuit “as a useful, but non-exclusive,
way for a patentee to prove entitlement to lost profits damages”).
71. Cohesive Techs., Inc. v. Waters Corp., 543 F.3d 1351, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(quoting Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v. Gencor Indus., Inc., 953 F.2d 1360, 1373 (Fed. Cir.
1991)).
72. Lemley, supra note 23, at 655–56, 658 (explaining that “[c]ourts take [the
Panduit] requirements seriously and quite often reject claims for lost profits”).
73. Id.; see also Trell v. Marlee Elecs. Corp., 912 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(holding that “[b]ecause [the patentee] did not sell its invention in the United States, [it]
could not seek damages on the basis of lost profits”).
74. See Allison, Lemley & Walker, supra note 32, at 3 (concluding that the mostlitigated patents are “disproportionately owned by nonpracticing entities”); see also
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2009 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY: PATENT LITIGATION
TRENDS AND THE INCREASING IMPACT OF NONPRACTICING ENTITIES 19, chart 9 (2010),
available
at
http://www.pwc.com/us/en/forensic-services/publications/assets/2009patent-litigation-study.pdf (finding that nonpracticing entities brought between 10% and 46%
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Recent empirical data demonstrate that lost profits is declining as
a basis for recovery for patent infringement.76 In a 2009 report,
PriceWaterhouseCoopers found that during the 1980s and 1990s, a
reasonable royalty was the basis for a minority of patent damages
awards—44% and 45%, respectively—compared to 55% and 51% for
lost profits.77 In the 2000s, however, these numbers were reversed,
with 54% of patent damages awards calculating using a reasonable
royalty, while only 40% were calculated as lost profits.78
B. Reasonable Royalty and the Hypothetical Negotiation
The Federal Circuit has held that a reasonable royalty is the
“minimum permissible measure of damages” for patent
infringement.79 In other words, it is “‘the floor below which
damages shall not fall.’”80 While a reasonable royalty traditionally has
served as a “backstop for those who cannot prove that they have lost
profits as a result of infringement,”81 more recently some patentees
who may have been able to prove lost profits instead have elected to

of patent lawsuits from 1995 through 2008 that resulted in a judgment on the merits in the 18
district courts with the largest number of patent suits).
In fact, the PriceWaterhouseCoopers study may underestimate the percentage of
patent litigation cases filed by nonpracticing entities, since such entities often seek early
settlements. See, e.g., Joe Mullin, Patent Litigation Weekly: Lessons of the Patent Troll Tracker,
IP L. & BUS.,
Jan.
31,
2010,
available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/
article.jsp?id=1202439670830 (explaining that nonpracticing entities often seek to “su[e] a
broad swath of companies for patent infringement, then settl[e] with each defendant for less
than the cost of fighting such a suit”).
75. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 74, at 11 (explaining that
nonpracticing entities “are generally not entitled to lost profits”).
76. See S. REP. NO. 110-259, at 11 (2008) (“Historically, the considerable majority of
infringement cases were lost profits cases. However, in recent years . . . . an increasing number
of cases require the calculation of an appropriate reasonable royalty.” (footnote omitted)).
77. LEVKO, supra note 25, at slide 9. These figures do not include 1% and 3% due to
price erosion in the 1980s and 1990s, respectively. Id.
78. Id. These figures do not include 6% due to price erosion. Id.
79. Deere & Co. v. Int’l Harvester Co., 710 F.2d 1551, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
80. Lucent Techs., Inc., v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(quoting Bandag, Inc. v. Gerrard Tire Co., 704 F.2d 1578, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1983)); see also
Lemley, supra note 23, at 655 (describing a reasonable royalty as a “fallback remedy”).
81. Lemley, supra note 23, at 655 (referring to 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006)).
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pursue a reasonable royalty, potentially obtaining a greater recovery
in the process.82
Section 284 does not contain explicit guidance on how courts or
juries should determine what royalty is “reasonable.” However,
courts frequently have attempted to answer this question using a
legal fiction: creating a hypothetical bargain between the parties for
use of the patented technology.83 This methodology, often “called
the ‘hypothetical negotiation’ or the ‘willing licensor-willing
licensee’ approach, attempts to ascertain the royalty upon which the
parties would have agreed had they successfully negotiated a[]
[licensing] agreement just before infringement began.”84 As the
Federal Circuit recently explained: “The hypothetical negotiation
tries, as best as possible, to recreate the ex ante licensing negotiation
scenario and to describe the resulting agreement. In other words, if
infringement had not occurred, willing parties would have executed
a license agreement specifying a certain royalty payment scheme.”85
Consequently, this approach attempts to approximate a market for
the patented technology as it would have developed absent
infringement.86

82. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 488 F.3d 973, 978–81 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(affirming a jury award of reasonable royalty damages of $40 per bag of soybean seed, which
was more than six times greater than plaintiff’s lost profits).
83. Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1324. Another, less common alternative method is the
“analytical approach,” which focuses on the infringer’s projected profit from the infringing
product. Id. Under this methodology, a reasonable royalty is calculated through a profitsharing approach, where the infringer would share a substantial portion of its anticipated
profits from infringement with the patentee. See, e.g., TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d
895, 899–900 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (affirming special master’s award of 30% royalty rate for
accused product with anticipated net profit of 37%–42%, after subtracting industry standard net
profit of 6.5%–12.5%). As one district court has explained:
The analytical method is based on the premise that any rate of return in excess of a
normal rate of return can be attributed to the patent. This method takes the profits
of the infringer, subtracts the infringer’s normal profit, and awards some portion of
the remainder to the patent owner.
Fresenius Med. Care Holdings, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., No. 03-1431, 2006 WL 1390416, at
*7 (N.D. Cal. May 18, 2006) (quoting Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants, Calculating
Intellectual Property Damages); see also SKENYON ET AL., supra note 27, § 3:4.
84. Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1324.
85. Id. at 1325.
86. Riles v. Shell Exploration & Prod. Co., 298 F.3d 1302, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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Interestingly, the idea of a hypothetical negotiation predates the
Georgia-Pacific test by several decades. For instance, in 1938, the
Sixth Circuit held:
In fixing damages on a royalty basis against an infringer, the sum
allowed should be reasonable and that which would be accepted by
a prudent licensee who wished to obtain a license but was not so
compelled and a prudent patentee, who wished to grant a license
but was not so compelled. In other words, the sum should be that
amount which a person desiring to use a patented machine and sell
its product at a reasonable profit would pay.87

Similarly, the Ninth Circuit explained in 1952 that
[a] reasonable royalty is an amount which a person, desiring to use
a patented article, as a business proposition, would be willing to
pay as a royalty and yet be able to use the patented article at a
reasonable profit. The primary inquiry, often complicated by
secondary ones, is what the parties would have agreed upon, if both
were reasonably trying to reach an agreement.88

The hypothetical negotiation framework has been subject to
significant criticism, most notably for its premise that both parties to
the negotiation would assume the asserted claims were both valid
and infringed—issues that are often contested in both real-life
licensing negotiations and litigation.89 This is not a trivial
assumption, since a significant percentage of patents are found either
invalid or not infringed during litigation.90 In addition, the

87. Horvath v. McCord Radiator & Mfg. Co., 100 F.2d 326, 335–36 (6th Cir. 1938);
see also Recovery in Patent Suits, supra note 50, at 849 (“A reasonable royalty may be defined
as the amount that a person desiring to use a patent would be willing to pay for its use and a
patent owner desiring to license the patent would be willing to accept.”).
88. Faulkner v. Gibbs, 199 F.2d 635, 639 (9th Cir. 1952) (footnote omitted).
89. See, e.g., Brian J. Love, The Misuse of Reasonable Royalty Damages as a Patent
Infringement Deterrent, 74 MO. L. REV. 909, 914 (2009). But see Blair & Cotter, supra note
69, at 41 (asserting that this assumption “nevertheless makes economic sense, because an
award that reflected the parties’ uncertainty at the time of the hypothetical negotiations in
effect would require the plaintiff to bear the risk of uncertainty twice: first, at the time of those
negotiations, and second when deciding whether to proceed to trial”).
90. See Paul M. Janicke & LiLan Ren, Who Wins Patent Infringement Cases?, 34 AIPLA
Q.J. 1, 3–6 (2006) (finding that less than 25% of patent owners prevailed to judgment in
patent litigation in 2002–2004). Another study found that approximately half (46%) of patents
litigated to judgment are invalid. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the
Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205 (1998); see also Jay P. Kesan &
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hypothetical negotiation unrealistically assumes a state of perfect
information—that each side knows all of the facts available to the
other side at the time of the negotiation.91
Finally, the hypothetical negotiation is potentially unrealistic
because it assumes that the parties could have reached an agreement
to license the patent at all. As the Federal Circuit has recognized, in
a normal licensing negotiation, the potential licensee has three
alternatives: (1) agree to a royalty payment; (2) infringe the patent
and risk litigation; or (3) forego use of the patented invention
entirely.92 The hypothetical negotiation assumes the first alternative,
when in reality the second actually occurred.93
An economically realistic hypothetical negotiation, however,
must also account for the third alternative: that the potential licensee
would not have used the patented technology at all. For example,
faced with an exorbitant licensing demand for the patented
technology, a rational licensee would explore reasonable alternatives,
such as developing or licensing a substitute technology.94 In other
words, a rational actor would consider the “best alternative to a

Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An Empirical Examination of the
Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 237, 275–76 (2006)
(estimating based on empirical data that “on the order of 300 improvidently granted patents
were invalidated each year in the mid-1990s”).
91. See, e.g., Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp, 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1122
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (explaining that the hypothetical negotiation “contemplate[s] a marshaling of
all of the pertinent facts which, like cards dealt face up, are for all to see”). In certain
circumstances, however, “factual developments occurring after the date of the hypothetical
negotiation can inform the damages calculation.” Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580
F.3d 1301, 1333 (Fed.Cir. 2009) (quoting Sinclair Ref. v. Jenkins Petroleum Process Co., 289
U.S. 689, 698 (1933)); see also Fromson v. W. Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568,
1575 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding that the hypothetical negotiation “permits and often requires a
court to look to events and facts that occurred thereafter and that could not have been known
to or predicted by the hypothesized negotiators”). For example, the Federal Circuit has
suggested that evidence regarding the accused infringer’s post-infringement usage of the
patented technology is permissible in a Georgia-Pacific analysis. Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1333–34.
92. Fromson, 853 F.2d at 1576.
93. Id.
94. See, e.g., Novozymes A/S v. Genencor Int’l, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 592, 607 (D.
Del. 2007) (holding that “the parties in a hypothetical negotiation would consider available, or
soon to be available, alternatives to the infringing product”); Fresenius Med. Care Holdings,
Inc., v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., No. 03-01431, 2006 WL 1646113, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 12, 2006)
(“[A] key part of the reasonable royalty determination under Georgia Pacific is whether the
accused infringer had acceptable non-infringing alternatives available to it at the time of the
hypothetical negotiation.”).
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negotiated agreement” (BATNA).95 Thus, in a hypothetical licensing
scenario, if a licensor insisted on a royalty that exceeded the expected
cost of a substitute, then the licensee would simply forego use of the
patent and switch to the substitute.96
Despite these shortcomings, however, the hypothetical
negotiation provides a useful framework for a reasonable royalty
analysis. It recognizes that the determination of a royalty involves a
zero-sum game, and focuses on the parties’ relative bargaining
strengths at the time infringement began.97 Both parties are assumed
to behave as rational and prudent businesspeople—or, as one court
put it, the negotiation involves the parties’ “perfectly reasonable
avatars.”98 They bargain in the face of shared information about key
facts, such as the infringer’s anticipated profits for the accused
product99 and whether and at what cost the infringer could have
switched to a noninfringing substitute.100 Some versions of the
hypothetical negotiation also sensibly recognize that the royalty
amount cannot prevent the hypothetical licensee from making a
reasonable profit101—otherwise, a rational licensee would have

95. See ROGER FISHER, WILLIAM URY & BRUCE PATTON, GETTING TO YES:
NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 104–06 (1981).
96. See infra Part V.A.
97. See, e.g., Procter & Gamble Co. v. Paragon Trade Brands, Inc., 989 F. Supp. 547,
606 (D. Del. 1997) (explaining that a “hypothetical negotiation” involves arm’s length
bargaining between the potential licensor and licensee) (citing Unisplay, S.A. v. Am. Elec. Sign
Co., 69 F.3d 512, 517 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
98. Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F. Supp. 2d 147, 150 (D.R.I. 2009).
99. Trans-World Mfg. Corp. v. Al Nyman & Sons, Inc., 750 F.2d 1552, 1568 (Fed.
Cir. 1984).
100. See Zygo Corp. v. Wyko Corp., 79 F.3d 1563, 1571–72 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding
that availability of a noninfringing substitute “is a factor relevant to the determination of a
proper royalty during hypothetical negotiations” and that the accused infringer “would have
been in a stronger position to negotiate for a lower royalty rate knowing it had a competitive
noninfringing device ‘in the wings’”).
101. See, e.g., Applied Med. Res. Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 435 F.3d 1356, 1361
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (stating that a reasonable royalty is the amount that a hypothetical licensee
“‘would be willing to pay as a royalty and yet be able to make, use, or sell the patented article,
in the market, at a reasonable profit’” (quoting Trans-World Mfg. Corp., 750 F.2d at 1568
(internal brackets omitted))); Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc., 718 F.2d 1075,
1081 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (holding that “a reasonable royalty would leave an infringer with
reasonable profit” (quoting Square Liner 360°, Inc. v. Chisum, 691 F.2d 362, 377 (8th Cir.
1982))); Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp, 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1122 (S.D.N.Y.
1970) (“[T]he very definition of a reasonable royalty assumes that, after payment, the infringer
will be left with a profit.” (internal quotations and citation omitted)). But see Monsanto Co. v.
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pursued the third alternative described above and foregone use of
the patented invention. As a result, while far from perfect, the
hypothetical negotiation is a useful heuristic for a jury to determine
what royalty would “fulfill[] the statutory mandate of being
‘reasonable.’”102
C. The Rise of Georgia-Pacific
For four decades, the calculation of a reasonable royalty has been
heavily influenced by the fifteen-factor test first articulated by the
district court in Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood
Corp.103 This test was subsequently adopted by the Federal Circuit
shortly after its inception,104 as well as one of its predecessor courts,
the Court of Claims.105 Georgia-Pacific has been called the “gold
standard” and “universally accepted test” for determining reasonable
royalty damages.106 A brief review of the Georgia-Pacific case,
however, helps illuminate the test’s somewhat surprising and casespecific origins.
The dispute between Georgia-Pacific and its rival in the plywood
market, United States Plywood, began in 1955, when GeorgiaPacific introduced plywood panels that were striated, or grooved, for
decorative effect.107 Striation prevented the plywood from tending to
expand and shrink under changing moisture conditions, which
resulted in cracks over a period of time. In addition, it made the
plywood more aesthetically pleasing.108 Georgia-Pacific’s striated

Ralph, 382 F.3d 1374, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that “the law does not require that an
infringer be permitted to make a profit”).
102. CAULEY, supra note 32, at 24.
103. 318 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
104. Hanson, 718 F.2d at 1077.
105. See Tektronix, Inc. v. United States, 552 F.2d 343, 349 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (concluding
that “the best method of computing compensation in this case is to adopt the approach of
establishing a reasonable royalty . . . . exemplified by the Georgia-Pacific case”). After its
creation, the Federal Circuit adopted previous decisions of the Court of Claims as binding
precedent. South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1982).
106. Durie & Lemley, supra note 1, at 628–29; see also PAUL M. JANICKE, MODERN
PATENT LITIGATION 56 (2d ed. 2006) (explaining that Georgia-Pacific “still is the most often
cited source . . . about determining a ‘reasonable royalty’”).
107. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 258 F.2d 124, 126–29 (2d Cir.
1958).
108. Id. at 126–27.
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plywood competed with U.S. Plywood’s own striated plywood
product, Weldtex, which practiced a patent issued in 1942 to Deskey
and assigned to U.S. Plywood.109
For unknown reasons, Georgia-Pacific delivered a sample of its
new striated plywood to U.S. Plywood shortly after introducing it on
the market.110 Immediately afterwards, U.S. Plywood’s president sent
a short letter to Georgia-Pacific, asserting that Weldtex was
protected by several U.S. patents111 and stating that U.S. Plywood
would take “vigorous action to protect our patent rights.”112
Georgia-Pacific then filed a declaratory judgment action in the
Southern District of New York for invalidity and noninfringement.
A case of almost Dickensian proportion ensued.113 In October
1956, the district court found the Deskey patent invalid and not
infringed by Georgia-Pacific.114 On appeal, however, the Second
Circuit reversed, holding in 1958 that claim 1 of the Deskey patent
was valid and infringed by Georgia-Pacific, and remanded for a
determination on damages.115 The district court then referred the
case to a special master to calculate damages.116 After receiving
testimony and briefing over a three-year period, the special master
filed a report in 1961 awarding $685,837 in damages to U.S.
Plywood based on disgorgement of Georgia-Pacific’s ill-gotten
profits.117 However, the special master rejected U.S. Plywood’s claim
for its own lost profits under § 284, finding that it had failed to
adequately establish the quantity of product and amount of profit
lost due to Georgia-Pacific’s infringement.118
Both parties filed objections to the special master’s report, and in
1965—ten years after the case started—the district court held in a
lengthy opinion that a reasonable royalty, not Georgia-Pacific’s
109. Id.
110. Id. at 127.
111. Two other plywood-related patents, called the Bailey patents, were referenced in the
dispute, but the Second Circuit held that these patents “were never in issue in the district
court.” Id. at 126.
112. Id. at 127.
113. See generally CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE (1853).
114. 148 F. Supp. 846 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
115. 258 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1958).
116. 243 F. Supp. 500, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
117. Id. at 512–13.
118. Id. at 513.
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profits, was the proper measure of damages.119 From 1967 through
1969, the district court held multiple hearings and received extensive
briefing on the issue of an appropriate reasonable royalty.120 But the
assigned judge (Judge William B. Herlands) died in August 1969
before he could issue an opinion.121 Judge Herlands, however, had
“substantially completed” a draft opinion, which the newly-assigned
judge, Judge Charles H. Tenney, considered and adopted in May
1970 “with minor amendment[s].”122
First, the district court explained that “[a] comprehensive list of
evidentiary facts relevant, in general, to the determination of a
reasonable royalty for a patent license may be drawn from a
conspectus of the leading cases.”123 Rather than including a
“comprehensive” list of factors, however, the opinion identified only
“some of the factors mutatis mutandis”124 that were “seemingly
more pertinent to the issue herein.”125 The first factor related to a socalled established royalty:
1. The royalties received by the patentee for the licensing of the
patent in suit, proving or tending to prove an established royalty.126

Factors 2 through 13 addressed a wide variety of considerations
at issue in the case, including the relationship of the licensing parties;
the type of license they likely would agree upon; comparable licenses
made by the licensee and in the relevant industry more generally; the
nature, benefits, extent of use, and alternatives to the patented
technology; and the value of features unrelated to the patent:

119. Id. at 503, 514–46.
120. See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1118
(S.D.N.Y. 1970).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1118–19 & n.3.
123. Id. at 1120.
124. “Mutatis mutandis” is a Latin phrase that means “[a]ll necessary changes having
been made” or “with the necessary changes.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 858 (8th ed. 2004).
Use of this phrase in the Georgia-Pacific decision “strongly suggests to future readers that this
particular list in its form may not be suitable or appropriate for application in future cases.”
Nathaniel C. Love, Comment, Nominal Reasonable Royalties for Patent Infringement, 75 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1749, 1754 n.28 (2008).
125. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 318 F. Supp. at 1120.
126. Id.
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2. The rates paid by the licensee for the use of other patents
comparable to the patent in suit.
3. The nature and scope of the license, as exclusive or nonexclusive; or as restricted or non-restricted in terms of territory or
with respect to whom the manufactured product may be sold.
4. The licensor’s established policy and marketing program to
maintain his patent monopoly by not licensing others to use the
invention or by granting licenses under special conditions designed
to preserve that monopoly.
5. The commercial relationship between the licensor and
licensee, such as, whether they are competitors in the same territory
in the same line of business; or whether they are inventor and
promoter.
6. The effect of selling the patented specialty in promoting sales
of other products of the licensee; that existing value of the
invention to the licensor as a generator of sales of his non-patented
items; and the extent of such derivative or convoyed sales.
7. The duration of the patent and the term of the license.
8. The established profitability of the product made under the
patent; its commercial success; and its current popularity.
9. The utility and advantages of the patent property over the old
modes or devices, if any, that had been used for working out
similar results.
10. The nature of the patented invention; the character of the
commercial embodiment of it as owned and produced by the
licensor; and the benefits to those who have used the invention.
11. The extent to which the infringer has made use of the
invention; and any evidence probative of the value of that use.
12. The portion of the profit or of the selling price that may be
customary in the particular business or in comparable businesses to
allow for the use of the invention or analogous inventions.
13. The portion of the realizable profit that should be credited
to the invention as distinguished from non-patented elements, the
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manufacturing process, business risks, or significant features or
improvements added by the infringer.127

Factor 14 restated the longstanding rule, first codified in the
1922 Act,128 that expert testimony could be offered regarding an
appropriate reasonable royalty:
14. The opinion testimony of qualified experts.129

Finally, Factor 15 adopted the hypothetical negotiation
framework that had been previously articulated by the Sixth and
Ninth Circuits:130
15. The amount that a licensor (such as the patentee) and a
licensee (such as the infringer) would have agreed upon (at the
time the infringement began) if both had been reasonably and
voluntarily trying to reach an agreement; that is, the amount which
a prudent licensee—who desired, as a business proposition, to
obtain a license to manufacture and sell a particular article
embodying the patented invention—would have been willing to
pay as a royalty and yet be able to make a reasonable profit and
which amount would have been acceptable by a prudent patentee
who was willing to grant a license.131

Surprisingly, the district court’s list of factors did not include any
citations to previous case law.132
Explaining that “there is no formula by which . . . [they] can be
rated precisely in the order of their relative importance or by which
their economic significance can be automatically transduced into
their pecuniary equivalent,” the district court declined to explain
how it balanced these factors.133 Rather, the court said that it would
exercise “judicial discretion”134 to consider “all pertinent factors”
based on the evidence.135

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
1937).
135.

Id.
See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
Georgia-Pacific Corp., 318 F. Supp. at 1120.
See supra text accompanying notes 87–88.
Georgia-Pacific Corp., 318 F. Supp. at 1120.
See id.
Id. at 1120–21.
Id. at 1120 (quoting Gen. Motors Corp. v. Dailey, 93 F.2d 938, 942 (6th Cir.
Id. at 1120–21.
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Similar to most current patent infringement litigation, the parties
in Georgia-Pacific proffered widely diverging royalty calculations.
Georgia-Pacific claimed that an appropriate royalty was between
$1.50 and $3 per thousand square feet of plywood. U.S. Plywood,
however, asserted that the royalty should be at least an order of
magnitude greater—$50 per thousand square feet.136
In its decision, the district court placed particular emphasis on
several of the above-listed factors in attempting to set a reasonable
royalty. First, it relied heavily on Factor 8—in particular, that before
Georgia-Pacific’s infringement, U.S. Plywood had enjoyed large
profits on Weldtex (on average, approximately $48 per thousand
square feet).137 It also considered Factors 4 and 5 at length,
emphasizing that U.S. Plywood had a policy of maintaining its
patent monopoly on striated plywood in the United States and was
unwilling to license this technology to a powerful competitor like
Georgia-Pacific.138 Third, the court put significant weight on Factor
13, holding that the patented technology—and not other features—
caused Weldtex and Georgia-Pacific’s own striated plywood product
to be highly profitable.139 In contrast, the court placed little or no
weight on other factors, such as foreign licenses granted under the
patent and other, plywood-related licenses entered into by GeorgiaPacific (Factors 2 and 12). Ultimately, the district court concluded
that U.S. Plywood’s proposed royalty of $50 per thousand square
feet of plywood represented “a fair and reasonable royalty” and
entered judgment in the amount of $800,000.140
Most accounts of Georgia-Pacific end with the district court
opinion.141 On appeal, however, the Second Circuit rebalanced some
of the factors considered and significantly reduced the district court’s

136. Id. at 1119.
137. Id. at 1127–29.
138. See id. at 1123–25.
139. See id. at 1134 (holding that “[t]here is no basis for [Georgia-Pacific]’s argument
that the value of striated fir plywood is significantly attributable to elements other than the
Deskey patent” and that “the commercial success of Weldtex was the result of deep striation of
the face, Deskey’s invention, which created a new type of plywood panel”).
140. Id. at 1143.
141. See, e.g., Durie & Lemley, supra note 1, at 631 (“[I]t is the district court’s opinion
that has become gospel in the patent damages world.”).
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award.142 While the Second Circuit sustained all of the district court’s
basic factual findings,143 it held that the lower court erred in not
giving sufficient weight to Factor 15—that in a hypothetical
negotiation, the “reasonable ‘royalty must be fixed so as to leave the
infringer, or suppositious licensee, a reasonable profit.’”144
Specifically, it explained that the district court found that at the time
infringement began, Georgia-Pacific reasonably expected to earn
profits similar to U.S. Plywood, calculated at about $48 per
thousand square feet. But the awarded royalty of $50 per square feet
would “gobble[] up all of [Georgia-Pacific]’s expected profit.”145
Based on this, the Second Circuit adjusted the reasonable royalty
rate downward to $35.65, lowering Georgia-Pacific’s total damages
by nearly one-third.146
The Georgia-Pacific case differs from many current patent
infringement cases in several important ways. First, it involved two
direct competitors with highly similar products. This is unlike a
substantial portion of current patent litigation, which involves
nonpracticing entities that do not offer products or services in
competition with the accused infringer.147
Second, the accused product in Georgia-Pacific—striated
plywood—was relatively simple, and the patented technology
accounted for most, if not all, of the product’s value. In contrast,
many modern patent cases involve complex products containing
dozens or even hundreds of features, of which the patented
technology may be a relatively small part.148 Further, Georgia-Pacific
involved a product covered by a single patent (or at most a handful

142. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers Inc., 446 F.2d 295 (2d
Cir. 1971).
143. Id. at 297.
144. Id. at 299 (quoting Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1122).
145. Id. The Second Circuit also noted that the district court’s total award of $800,000
exceeded the amount that the special master found to be Georgia-Pacific’s actual profits from
the infringement ($685,837). Id.
146. Id. at 300.
147. See supra Part III.A.
148. See, e.g., infra note 160 and accompanying text (explaining that Apple has been
sued for alleged infringements of more than 120 patents relating to the iPhone and that the
iPhone has also licensed many more patents through various standards).
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of U.S. Plywood patents). Today, however, many accused hightechnology products practice numerous patents.149
Finally—and perhaps most significantly—damages in the
Georgia-Pacific case, like most patent infringement litigation at that
time, were tried to and determined by a judge, who had the time
and expertise to consider complicated financial and technological
evidence and prepare a detailed opinion explaining the court’s
findings and conclusions.150 In contrast, today most patent litigation
is tried before a jury,151 which often has less time and expertise than a
judge, and which cannot be required to make detailed written
findings for scrutiny in post-trial review.152 The cumulative impact of
these differences will be discussed in the following section.
IV. THE PROBLEMATIC APPLICATION OF GEORGIA-PACIFIC
IN MODERN PATENT LITIGATION
“Determining a fair and reasonable royalty . . . seem[s] often to
involve more the talents of a conjurer than those of a judge.”153

As explained below, application of the forty-year-old GeorgiaPacific test in modern patent infringement litigation is often
problematic and may lead to overcompensation of the patentee.
Indeed, the Georgia-Pacific test is particularly inappropriate in cases
involving complex products incorporating a wide array of high-tech
components or features. Even when the accused product is less
complex, Georgia-Pacific gives juries little guidance on how to weigh
the numerous factors and reach a decision on an appropriate royalty.
Finally, the amorphous, “black box” nature of Georgia-Pacific makes
it difficult for courts to review a jury award in post-trial proceedings
to determine if it is supported by substantial evidence.

149. This phenomenon is called “royalty stacking.” See infra Part IV.A.
150. Douglas G. Smith, Structural and Functional Aspects of the Jury: Comparative
Analysis and Proposals for Reform, 48 ALA. L. REV. 441, 489–95 (1997).
151. See, e.g., Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases—An Empirical Peek
Inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 366 (2000) (finding that from 1968–1970, juries
tried only 2.8% of patent cases; in “contrast, from 1997–1999, 59% of all patent trials were
tried to juries”).
152. See infra Part IV.D (recounting scholarly criticism about the comparative
competency of decision-making by juries compared to judges in complex, lengthy litigation).
153. ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting
Fromson v. W. Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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A. Royalty Stacking

One major issue with Georgia-Pacific is that it does not
effectively address royalty stacking. Royalty stacking exists when a
single, technologically complex product potentially practices
numerous patents, and thus “may bear multiple royalty burdens.”154
As the Senate Judiciary Committee has recently explained, “[l]ong
past is the day in which the typical invention is a sui generis
creation.”155 This was the case in Georgia-Pacific itself, where a
single patent covered the entire product.156 Rather, “today’s patents
are often combinations, and many products . . . [practice] dozens, if
not hundreds or even thousands of patents, and the infringed patent
may well be one smaller part of a much larger whole.”157
Royalty stacking “reflects the fact that, from the perspective of
the firm making the product in question, all of the different claims
for royalties must be added or ‘stacked’ together to determine the
total royalty burden borne by the product.”158 This is a particularly
difficult issue in the information technology, electronics, and
telecommunications industries, where a single integrated product
may include hundreds of separate components.159 As a result, a
complex product could potentially infringe—and thus require
licensing agreements for—scores of patents owned by numerous
different entities. For example, Apple’s iPhone has been accused of
infringing over 120 separate patents held by dozens of plaintiffs.160
154. Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L.
REV. 1991, 1993 (2007); see also Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses,
Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 123–
24 (Adam B. Jaffe, Josh Lerner & Scott Stern eds., 2001), available at
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/thicket.pdf.
155. S. REP. NO. 110-259, at 12 (2008).
156. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1132 (S.D.N.Y.
1970); see also id. (“[T]he contribution of the [patented] invention cannot be isolated as a
separate physical part. The invention permeated the [accused Georgia-Pacific] plywood panel
to such a degree that it should be considered as covering the article as a whole.”).
157. S. REP. NO. 110-259, at 12.
158. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 154, at 1993.
159. See Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 19.
160. Plaintiff VirnetX Inc.’s Original Complaint at 7–10, VirnetX Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc.
No. 6:10-cv-00417-LED (E.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 2010) (asserting that the iPhone infringes two
U.S. patents); Complaint for Patent Infringement at 2–3, Emblaze Ltd. v. Apple Inc., No.
1:10-cv-05713-PKC (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 2010) (asserting that the iPhone infringes U.S. Patent
No. 6,389,473, which claims methods for real-time broadcasting over a network); Third
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Amended Complaint for Patent Infringement at 15–18, MONKEYmedia, Inc. v. Apple, Inc.,
No. 1:10-cv-00319-SS (W.D. Tex. July 19, 2010) (asserting that iOS 4, which is the current
version of the iPhone operating system, infringes two U.S. patents); Complaint for Patent
Infringement at 12–23, NTP, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., No. 3:10-cv-00467-JRS (E.D. Va. July 8,
2010) (asserting that the iPhone infringes eight U.S. patents regarding wireless email);
Complaint for Patent Infringement at 11, 25, 39–40, Keranos, LLC v. Analog Devices., Inc.,
No. 2:10-cv-00207-TJW (E.D. Tex. June 23, 2010) (asserting that the iPhone infringes three
U.S. patents involving “integrated circuits using embedded flash memory”); Complaint for
Patent Infringement at 10–11, 19–20, UO! IP of Del., LLC v. ABBYY USA Software House,
Inc., No. 1:10-cv-00445-LPS (D. Del. May 27, 2010) (asserting that iPhone infringes two
U.S. patents involving language translation software); Complaint for Patent Infringement at
17–21, Golden Bridge Tech., Inc. v. AT&T, Inc., No. 1:10-cv-00428-SLR (D. Del. May 21,
2010) (asserting that the iPhone infringes two U.S. patents); Complaint for Patent
Infringement at 2–3, SoftView LLC v. Apple, Inc., No. 1:10-cv-00389-LPS (D. Del. May 10,
2010) (asserting that the iPhone infringes U.S. Patent No. 7,461,353, entitled “Scalable
Display of Internet Content on Mobile Devices”); Complaint for Patent Infringement at 1,
Nokia Corp. v. Apple Inc., No. 3:10-cv-00249-wmc (W.D. Wis. May 7, 2010) (asserting that
the iPhone infringes five Nokia patents); Complaint for Patent Infringement and Demand for
Jury Trial at 2, NetAirus Techs. LLC v. Apple Inc., No. 2:10-cv-03257-GAF-E (C.D. Cal.
Apr. 30, 2010) (asserting that the iPhone infringes U.S. Patent No. 7,103,380); Complaint for
Patent Infringement at 6–17, MobileMedia Ideas LLC v. Apple Inc., No. 1:10-cv-00258-SLR
(D. Del. Mar. 31, 2010) (asserting that the iPhone infringes thirteen U.S. patents); Complaint
for Patent Infringement at passim, Microunity Sys. Eng’g, Inc. v. Acer, Inc., No. 2:10-cv00091-TJW-CE (E.D. Tex. Mar. 16, 2010) (asserting that the iPhone infringes twelve U.S.
patents regarding microprocessor technology); Complaint at 7, ADC Tech. Inc. v. LG Elecs.
Mobilecomm U.S.A., Inc., No. 1:10-cv-01456 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 4, 2010) (asserting that the
iPhone infringes 3 U.S. patents); Complaint at 8–12, Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. Nike, Inc.,
No. 2:10-cv-00054-DF-CE (E.D. Tex. Feb. 16, 2010) (asserting that the iPhone, in
conjunction with the Nike+ line of products, infringes U.S. Patent Nos. 7,062,225,
7,251,454, and 7,519,327); Complaint at 2–4, Intellect Wireless, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., No.
1:10-cv-00586 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 28, 2010) (asserting that the iPhone infringes U.S. Patent Nos.
7,310,416 and 7,266,186); Complaint and Jury Claim at 2–4, Eastman Kodak Co. v. Apple,
Inc., No. 6:10-cv-06021-MAT-JWF (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2010) (asserting that the iPhone
infringes U.S. Patent Nos. 6,292,218 and 5,493,335); Complaint for Patent Infringement at
2, 6, St. Clair Intellectual Prop. Consultants, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., No. 1:09-cv-00804-LPS (D.
Del. Oct. 26, 2009) (asserting infringement of four U.S. patents by the iPhone’s digital
camera); Complaint for Patent Infringement and Declaratory Judgment at 1, Nokia Corp. v.
Apple, Inc., No. 1:09-cv-00791-GMS (D. Del. Oct. 22, 2009) (asserting that the iPhone
violates ten patents for wireless transmission technologies); Fifth Amended Complaint for
Patent Infringement at 6–7, EMG Tech., LLC v. Apple, Inc., No. 6:08-cv-00447-LED (E.D.
Tex. Oct. 20, 2009) (asserting infringement of U.S. Patent Nos. 7,020,845 and 7,441,196);
Second Amended Complaint and Application for Permanent Injunction at 7–9, Bandspeed,
Inc. v. Sony Elecs. Inc., No. 1:09-cv-00593-LY (W.D. Tex. Oct. 9, 2009) (asserting, inter
alia, infringement of U.S. Patent Nos. 7,027,418 and 7,570,614); Complaint for Patent
Infringement at 42, Xpoint Techs. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 1:09-cv-00628-SLR (D. Del. Aug.
21, 2009) (asserting, inter alia, that the iPhone infringes U.S. Patent No. 5,913,028); First
Amended Complaint for Patent Infringement at 9, 11–12, Shared Memory Graphics LLC v.
Apple, Inc., No. 5:09-cva-05128-BSM (W.D. Ark. Aug. 17, 2009) (asserting infringement of
U.S. Patent Nos. 5,712,664 and 6,081,279 by, inter alia, the iPhone); Second Amended
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And this figure does not include the hundreds or thousands of
patents licensed by Apple as part of the iPhone’s use of the Wi-Fi
and 3G data transmission standards.161 Royalty stacking is also a
potential issue in the biotechnology field, where a “‘dense web of

Complaint for Patent Infringement at 2, 7–8, MSTG, Inc. v. Research In Motion Ltd., No.
1:08-cv-07411 (N.D. Ill. July 30, 2009) (asserting, inter alia, that the iPhone infringes three
U.S. patents); Original Complaint at 6, 9, 12, 15, 18, BTG Int’l Inc. v. Apple Inc., No. 2:09cv-00223-TJW-CE (E.D. Tex. July 20, 2009) (asserting, inter alia, that the iPhone infringes
five U.S. patents); Complaint for Patent Infringement at 1, 4–6, Pers. Audio, LLC v. Apple,
Inc., No: 9:09-cv-00111-RC (E.D. Tex. June 25, 2009) (asserting infringement of U.S.
Patent Nos. 6,199,076 and 7,509,178); Complaint for Patent Infringement at 1, 5–6, SPH
Am., LLC v. Nokia Corp., No. 1:09-cv-00701-GBL-TCB (E.D. Va. filed June 25, 2009)
(asserting infringement of U.S. Patent No. RE 40,385 by, inter alia, the iPhone); Complaint
for Patent Infringement at 1–3, Elan Microelectronics Corp. v. Apple, Inc., No. 5:09-cv01531-RS (N.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2009) (asserting infringement of U.S. Patent No. 5,825,352);
Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint for Patent Infringement at 1, 3, Accolade Sys. LLC v.
Micron Tech., Inc., No. 2:09-cv-00086-TJW-CE (E.D. Tex. Mar. 24, 2009) (asserting, inter
alia, that the iPhone infringes U.S. Patent No. 7,463,298); Complaint at 2–5, Affinity Labs of
Tex., LLC, v. Apple, Inc., No. 9:09-cv-00047-RC (E.D. Tex. Mar. 24, 2009) (asserting
infringement of U.S. Patent Nos. 7,187,947, 7,440,772, and 7,486,926); Complaint for
Patent Infringement at 2–3, MONEC Holding AG v. Apple, Inc., No. 1:09-cv-00312-LMBJFA (E.D. Va. Mar. 23, 2009) (asserting infringement of U.S. Patent No. 6,335,678);
Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint for Patent Infringement at 5–6, Typhoon Touch Techs.,
Inc. v. Dell, Inc., No. 6:07-cv-00546-LED (E.D. Tex. Mar. 6, 2009) (asserting, inter alia,
that the iPhone infringes U.S. Patent Nos. 5,379,057 and 5,675,362); Complaint at 2–3,
Picsel (Research) Ltd. v. Apple, Inc., No. 1:09-cv-00100-SLR (D. Del. Feb. 13, 2009)
(asserting infringement of U.S. Patent No. 7,009,626); Complaint for Patent Infringement at
3, Cygnus Sys., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 2:08-cv-02337-NVW (D. Ariz. Dec. 23, 2008)
(asserting, inter alia, that the iPhone infringes U.S. Patent No. 7,346,850); Complaint at 9–
22, WiAV Solutions LLC v. Research In Motion Ltd., No. 3:08-cv-00627-REP (E.D. Va.
Sept. 26, 2008) (asserting, inter alia, that the iPhone infringes ten U.S. patents); First
Amended Complaint at 6–9, Saxon Innovations, LLC v. Apple, Inc., No. 6:08-cv-00265-JDL
(E.D. Tex. Aug. 21, 2008) (asserting, inter alia, infringement of U.S. Patent Nos. 5,530,597
and 5,247,621); Amended Complaint at 3, Figa v. Apple, Inc., No. 1:08-cv-10304-NG (D.
Mass. Mar. 21, 2008) (asserting infringement of U.S. Patent No. 4,924,496); Original
Complaint at 3–5, Mirror Worlds LLC v. Apple, Inc., No. 6:08-cv-00088-LED (E.D. Tex.
Mar. 14, 2008) (asserting infringement by iPhone of three U.S. patents); Complaint and
Demand for Jury Trial at 2–3, Minerva Indus., Inc. v. Apple, Inc., No. 2:08-cv-00019-CE
(E.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 2008) (asserting infringement of U.S. Patent No. 7,321,783); Complaint
for Patent Infringement at 4–5, Klausner Techs. Inc. v. Apple, Inc., No. 2:07-cv-00525-LEDJDL (E.D. Tex. Dec. 3, 2007) (asserting infringement of U.S. Patent Nos. 5,572,576 and
5,283,818); Complaint for Patent Infringement at 2, SP Techs., LLC v. Apple, Inc., No. 6:07cv-00367-JDL (E.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2007) (asserting infringement of U.S. Patent No.
6,784,873). Notably, this tally does not include allegations of infringement that have not
resulted in litigation.
161. See infra note 167 and accompanying text (explaining that the wireless 3G standard
may implicate thousands of patents).
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overlapping intellectual property rights’” may require companies to
obtain numerous licenses.162
Royalty stacking can also present a problem for industry
standards, such as those for consumer electronics or
telecommunications networks. This problem has been partially
addressed in some cases by pooling the “essential” patents held by
multiple parties together and assigning a single entity to handle
licensing for the entire patent pool.163 For example, the pool of
patents covering the DVD standard offers nonexclusive licenses for
210 “essential” patents on behalf of three separate firms.164 But if a
standard becomes popular, and a patent reading on the standard is
not licensed as part of a pool, the patent can confer significant
market power to its owner.165 As the Third Circuit recently explained
in an antitrust case:
A [standard-setting organization] may complete its lengthy process
of evaluating technologies and adopting a new standard, only to
discover that certain technologies essential to implementing the
standard are patented. When this occurs, the patent holder is in a
position to “hold up” industry participants from implementing the
standard. Industry participants who have invested significant
resources developing products and technologies that conform to
the standard will find it prohibitively expensive to abandon their

162. Vincent J. Napoleon, Impact of Global Patent and Regulatory Reform on Patent
Strategies for Biotechnology, 9 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 3, 25 (2008) (quoting Shapiro,
supra note 154, at 120). But see John P. Walsh et al., Effects of Research Tool Patents and
Licensing on Biomedical Innovation, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 285
(Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003) (disputing the anticommons problem and
concluding that “drug discovery has not been substantially impeded” by overlapping patent
rights in biotechnology); Richard A. Epstein & Bruce N. Kuhlik, Is There a Biomedical
Anticommons?, REG., Summer 2004, at 54 (arguing that “Heller and Eisenberg have
overstated the case against patent protection at both the theoretical and empirical levels”). See
generally Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698 (May 1, 1998).
163. See Shapiro, supra note 154, at 134 (“A patent pool involves a single entity . . . that
licenses the patents of two or more companies to third parties as a package.”). Some patent
pools have an “independent patent expert” that “determine[s] whether a patent in the pool is
in fact essential.” Id. at 134–35.
164. Letter from Joel I. Klein, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to
Garrard R. Beeney, Esq., Sullivan & Cromwell 4 (Dec. 16, 1998), http://www.justice.gov/
atr/public/busreview/2121.pdf.
165. Shapiro, supra note 154, at 136.
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investment and switch to another standard. They will have become
“locked in” to the standard.166

For complex technologies like the 3G wireless standard, where
literally thousands of patents may be implicated,167 the royalty
stacking issue is readily apparent: if each patentee claimed only a few
percentage points of an accused product’s price as a “reasonable”
royalty, the licensing costs would quickly swallow up the product’s
profit margin. And this is not merely a hypothetical problem, as
Microsoft learned in its MP3 patent litigation with Lucent—the jury
awarded Lucent a $1.53 billion royalty for infringement of two
MP3-related patents, even though Microsoft had already licensed
other “essential” patents for the MP3 standard for significantly
less.168
While one Georgia-Pacific factor theoretically can address the
problem of royalty stacking—Factor 13 (the portion of profit that
should be credited to the patented technology)—several practical
difficulties prevent it from effectively doing so. First, under GeorgiaPacific, royalty rates are often calculated as a percentage of the entire
product’s sales price or profitability, which serves to obscure the
value of other technologies in the accused product. For example, in
Cornell University v. Hewlett-Packard Co.,169 plaintiff Cornell
University (“Cornell”) prevailed at trial on its claim that HewlettPackard’s (“HP”) CPU bricks170 for computer servers and
workstations infringed Cornell’s patent for an improved method and
apparatus for issuing multiple “computer processor instructions in a
single machine clock cycle.”171 After trial, however, Federal Circuit
Judge Rader, sitting by designation, granted HP’s motion for
judgment as a matter of law against Cornell’s proffered royalty
calculation because Cornell’s claimed royalty base—the CPU

166. Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 310 (3d Cir. 2007).
167. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 154, at 2025–28.
168. Lucent Techs. Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 509 F. Supp. 2d 912 (S.D. Cal. 2007); see also
Douglas Heingartner, Patent Fights Are a Legacy of MP3’s Tangled Origins, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
5, 2007, at C3.
169. 609 F. Supp. 2d 279 (N.D.N.Y. 2009).
170. “CPU bricks” are modules that contain a central processing unit (“CPU”)
“combined with a temperature controlling thermal solution, external cache memory, and a
power converter.” Id. at 283.
171. Id.
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bricks—“incorporated much more [technology] than the claimed
invention.”172 As a result, Judge Rader concluded that Cornell had
impermissibly sought “economic entitlement to damages based on
technology beyond the scope” of the patented invention.173
Second, in the context of royalty stacking, Georgia-Pacific’s
emphasis on royalty rates for comparable licenses may conflict with
economic reality. Factor 12 instructs the jury to consider customary
industry licensing rates for similar technology.174 While this appears
sensible at first glance, it presents significant problems for complex
products that practice numerous patents. Frequently, patent holders
claim that they should be awarded a royalty rate at least as high as
those prevalent in the same field of technology, which may range
from 1% to over 10%, depending on the industry.175 These
arguments are often successful, as patentees frequently receive
reasonable royalties in excess of 10% at trial.176 This is generally not a
problem for cases where, like Georgia-Pacific itself, the accused
product is covered by a single patent. However, such royalty rates are
economically unsustainable for complex products that practice
numerous patents. Even if a product has a high profit margin—say
50%177—a few such licenses would either consume the product’s

172. Id. at 284.
173. Id. at 284–85; see also id. at 283 (criticizing Cornell’s damages expert for basing
Cornell’s royalty claim on Hewlett-Packard’s “servers and systems [that] include vast amounts
of technology beyond the infringing part of the processors”).
174. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y.
1970).
175. See, e.g., Boston Sci. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, No. C02-00790 SI, 2009 WL
975424, at *6–7 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2009) (offering evidence that infringer entered into eight
prior licensing agreements with royalty rates of 3.7% to 4.6%, and that the royalty rates for the
industry are between 2% to 6%; the court ultimately awarded a royalty rate of 5.1%);
Novozymes A/S v. Genencor Int’l, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 592, 601, 607 (D. Del. 2007)
(relying on reports that industry licenses range from 4.7% to 11.9% for the chemical industry
and 7.3% to 9.6% for biotechnology to claim—and receive—a royalty rate of 20% from the
court); Hynix Semiconductors, Inc. v. Rambus, Inc., No. CV-00-20905 RMW, 2006 WL
1991760, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 14, 2006) (relying on stated median royalty rate of 3.2% for
the electronics industry to calculate proposed damages).
176. Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro have found that the average royalty rate in all
reasonable royalty cases is 13.1% of the infringing product’s price. Lemley & Shapiro, supra
note 154, at 2032.
177. For example, one estimate has pegged the profit margin on Apple’s iPhone as
approximately 58%. Turley Muller, Apple Inc. (AAPL): iPhone’s Substantial Impact on Gross
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entire profit or produce a Cournot complements effect,178 whereby
the aggregate impact of multiple, above-market royalty agreements
would cause the producer to raise prices on the accused product,
leading to an economically inefficient outcome.179 This result would
be contrary to the requirement that a reasonable royalty must permit
the licensee “‘to make, use, or sell the patented article, in the market,
at a reasonable profit.’”180
Third, the royalty stacking issue can be compounded by
application of the so-called “rule of thumb.” The “rule of thumb”
suggests that a patent licensee should pay a royalty of 25%181 of the
expected profit from the product incorporating the patent.182
According to some proponents, the “rule of thumb” represents an
easily-applied method to apportion a technology’s value between the

Margin, FINANCIAL ALCHEMIST, July 29, 2009, http://financial-alchemist.blogspot.com/
2009/07/apple-inc-aapl-iphones-substantial.html (July 29, 2009).
178. As Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro have explained, the Cournot complements effect
occurs “when multiple input owners each charge more than marginal cost for their input,
thereby raising the price of the downstream product and reducing sales of that product.”
Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 154, at 2013. See generally AUGUSTIN COURNOT, RESEARCHES
INTO THE MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES OF THE THEORY OF WEALTH (W.J. Ashley ed.,
Nathaniel T. Bacon trans., MacMillan Company 1897) (1838).
179. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 154, at 2013, 2015–16.
180. Applied Med. Res. Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp. 435 F.3d 1356, 1361 (Fed. Cir.
2006) (quoting Trans-World Mfg. Corp. v. Al Nyman & Sons, Inc., 750 F.2d 1552, 1568
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (internal brackets omitted)); see also Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc.,
718 F.2d 1075, 1081 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (explaining that it “is implicit” that “a reasonable
royalty would leave an infringer with a reasonable profit” (internal quotations and citation
omitted)); Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1122 (S.D.N.Y.
1970) (noting that “the very definition of a reasonable royalty assumes that, after payment,
‘the infringer be left with a profit’”) (quoting Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp.,
243 F. Supp. 500, 539 (S.D.N.Y 1965)). But see Mars, Inc. v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., 527 F.3d
1359, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that “the law does not require that an infringer be
permitted to make a profit” (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Ralph, 382 F.3d 1374, 1384 (Fed. Cir.
2004))).
181. Some versions of the “rule of thumb” describe the royalty as a range from 25% to
33% of expected profits that may be adjusted upwards or downwards. See, e.g., Novozymes
A/S v. Genencor Int’l, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 592, 606 (D. Del. 2007); Std. Mfg. Co., Inc. v.
United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 748, 766 (1999); see also RUSSELL PARR, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
INFRINGEMENT DAMAGES: A LITIGATION SUPPORT HANDBOOK (1999) (asserting that the
rule of thumb “calculates a royalty as 25% to 33 1/3% of the gross profit, before taxes, from
the enterprise operations in which the licensed intellectual property is used”).
182. See, e.g., Ted Hagelin, Valuation of Patent Licenses, 12 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J.
423, 425 (2003–2004).
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licensor and licensee.183 Several Georgia-Pacific factors are implicated
by the “rule of thumb,” including Factors 8 (profitability and
commercial success of the product practicing the patent) and 12
(portion of profit customary in the industry to use the invention).
Although the “rule of thumb” has been utilized by patentees as
part of the Georgia-Pacific analysis,184 it has been justly criticized for
numerous reasons.185 For example, it sets an arbitrary value for the
patented technology (25%) without considering either the benefits it
provides over the prior art or the level of its expected use in the
accused product.186 In addition, it fails to consider the availability of
potential substitutes to the patented technology and the impact such
substitutes would have on the parties’ hypothetical negotiations.187
Furthermore, application of the “rule of thumb” is particularly
problematic in the context of royalty stacking. For complex products
covered by dozens or hundreds of patents, if each potential licensor
demanded a 25% share of the product’s projected profits, four such
183. Ted Hagelin, A New Method to Value Intellectual Property, 30 AIPLA Q.J. 353, 370
(2002). See generally Robert Goldscheider, John Jarosz & Carla Mulhern, Use of the 25 Percent
Rule in Valuing IP, LES NOUVELLES 123 (Dec. 2002), available at
http://www.bu.edu/otd/files/2009/11/goldscheider-25-percent-rule.pdf.
184. See, e.g., i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 853–54 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(declining to find plaintiff’s damages expert’s use of 25% rule of thumb unreliable under
Daubert); Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp. 632 F. Supp. 2d 147, 150 (D.R.I. 2009),
rev’d in relevant part,
No. 2010-1035, 2011 WL 9738, at *16-22 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 4, 2011)
(recognizing that “the rule of thumb calculation” is “widely accepted”); Civix v. Expedia, No.
03 C 3792, 2005 WL 5961023, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 25, 2005) (permitting the patentee’s
damages expert to use the “rule of thumb” as a methodology to calculate damages); W.L.
Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Int’l Med. Prosthetics Res. Assocs., Inc., No. CIV 84-559 PHX CLH,
1990 WL 180490, at *23 (D. Ariz. July 9, 1990) (“As a general rule of thumb, a royalty of 25
percent of net profits is used in license negotiations.”).
185. A detailed criticism of the “rule of thumb” is outside the scope of this Article. For a
summary of previous criticism, see Amy L. Landers, Let the Games Begin: Incentives to
Innovation in the New Economy of Intellectual Property Law, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 307,
332–35 (2006).
186. See, e.g., Paul E. Schaafsma, An Economic Overview of Patents, 79 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 241, 251–52 (1997) (explaining that the “rule of thumb” represents
“an arbitrary fraction” and “does not relate to the value and degree to which the patent can
exclude substitute products and therefore command a patent profit”); Lauren Johnston Stiroh
& Richard T. Rapp, Modern Methods for the Valuation of Intellectual Property, 532 PLI/Pat
817, 823–24 (1998); Roy J. Epstein, Modeling Patent Damages: Rigorous and Defensible
Calculations 6 (2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.royepstein.com/
epstein_aipla_2003_article_website.pdf (asserting that the rule of thumb is “essentially
arbitrary” and “divorced from economic analysis”).
187. Hagelin, supra note 182, at 426.

1696

DO NOT DELETE

1661

2/16/2011 12:58 PM

Reconsidering the Georgia-Pacific Standard

licenses would consume the entire profit derived from the product.
No “economically rational” licensee would agree to enter into patent
licenses where the combined costs would exceed the product’s
projected profits.188 Recently, in Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,
the Federal Circuit agreed with these criticisms, holding that the 25%
“rule of thumb” was “arbitrary,” “unreliable,” and a “fundamentally
flawed tool for determining a baseline royalty rate in a hypothetical
negotiation.”189
B. Apportionment
A related problem is the difficulty of assessing the patented
technology’s value in a complex, high-tech product as compared to
other, noninfringing features. This inquiry, called apportionment,
limits damages to the patent holder “to only the losses that are
attributable to the patented invention.”190 The goal of
apportionment is to prevent the overcompensation of patent holders
by precluding recovery of damages for features that go beyond the
scope of the patent’s exclusive rights.191
Apportionment has deep roots in patent law192 and is embodied
in Georgia-Pacific Factor 13, which provides that the jury must
consider “[t]he portion of the realizable profit that should be
credited to the invention as distinguished from non-patented
elements, the manufacturing process, business risks, or significant
features or improvements added by the infringer.”193 While a good
idea in theory, apportionment has proven difficult to implement
properly in practice. As a practical matter, at trial, juries hear

188. Id. at 427.
189. __ F.3d __, No. 2010-1035, 2011 WL 9738, at *19,*22 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 4, 2011).
190. Tim Carlton, Note, The Ongoing Royalty: What Remedy Should a Patent Holder
Receive When a Permanent Injunction is Denied?, 43 GA. L. REV. 543, 553 (2009).
191. See Eric E. Bensen, Apportionment of Lost Profits in Contemporary Patent Damages
Cases, 10 VA. J.L. & TECH. 8 ¶¶ 18–20 (2005).
192. See, e.g., Garretson v. Clark, 111 U.S. 120, 121 (1884) (“The patentee . . . must in
every case give evidence tending to separate or apportion the defendant’s profits and the
patentee’s damages between the patented feature[s] and the unpatented features.” (internal
citations omitted)); see also Bensen, supra note 191, ¶ 3 (“[B]etween 1853 and 1915, the
Supreme Court addressed apportionment more than thirty-five times in patent damages
decisions, sometimes in two or three decisions in the same year.”).
193. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y.
1970).
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extensive evidence from the patent holder regarding the critical
importance of the patented invention but often receive little or no
information regarding “all the other things that contribute to the
success” of the accused product, such as other inventions and the
contributions of defendants’ own technology and marketing
efforts.194 Indeed, it would be virtually impossible to explain the
importance of all the other, noninfringing components and features
contained in complex products like computer operating systems or
smartphones—such a presentation likely would take weeks or
months of highly technical testimony, which few judges would allow
(and few jurors would want to endure).195 As a result, juries often
come away from a trial “with an inflated sense of the relative value of
[the patented] invention” and consequently award a
disproportionately high royalty.196
The apportionment problem is aptly illustrated by Lucent v.
Gateway,197 one of the most recent Federal Circuit cases applying the
Georgia-Pacific standard. In Lucent, the patented invention was a
graphical date-picking feature embodied in Microsoft Outlook.198 At
trial, the jury awarded Lucent approximately $358 million in
reasonable royalty damages.199 On appeal, however, the Federal
Circuit vacated the damages award, in part because the jury failed to
properly consider the value of the patented technology relative to the
rest of the accused product.200 Although “[t]he parties presented
little evidence relating to” this Georgia-Pacific factor, the court held

194. DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW COURTS CAN
SOLVE IT 29–30 (Univ. of Chicago Press, 2009); see also i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp.,
598 F.3d 831, 852–53, 855 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (recounting the argument by plaintiff’s damages
expert that “the infringing custom XML editor was critical to Microsoft’s sales” of Microsoft
Word, even though a survey revealed that only 1.9% of all copies of Word “were used in an
infringing manner”).
195. For example, during the January 2007 release of the original iPhone, CEO Steve
Jobs said that Apple had filed over 200 patent applications related to it. Lev Grossman, The
Apple of Your Ear, TIME, Jan. 22, 2007, at 48, 54. In addition, a proper apportionment
analysis would have to take Apple’s highly successful marketing campaign for the iPhone into
consideration. See, e.g., Ellis Booker, Apple’s Masterful Marketing of iPhone, BTOB, June 17,
2007, at 8, available at 2007 WLNR 13901677.
196. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 194, at 30.
197. 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
198. Id. at 1317.
199. Id. at 1325.
200. Id. at 1332, 1338.
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that “the only reasonable conclusion is that most of the realizable
profit [from Microsoft Outlook] must be credited to non-patented
elements.”201 It found that the accused product was “an enormously
complex software program comprising hundreds, if not thousands or
even more, [of] features” and that the infringing technology was a
“tiny feature of one part of a much larger software program.”202 In
addition, it held that numerous features other than the patented
technology accounted for the “overwhelming majority of the
consumer demand,” and the portion of the profit attributable to the
date-picking feature was “exceedingly small.”203 As a result, it
appears that juries have great difficulty properly apportioning the
value of the patented technology under Georgia-Pacific when this
technology is only one part of a much larger product.
C. Entire Market Value Rule
A third problematic issue is application of the “entire market
value rule” in conjunction with the Georgia-Pacific analysis.204
Although not part of the Georgia-Pacific test itself, the entire market
value rule is often invoked by patentees to calculate the royalty base
for a reasonable royalty award.
The entire market value rule permits a patentee to recover
damages based on an entire product when the patentee can establish
that the patented technology “constitutes the basis for customer
demand.”205 Thus, “[t]he ‘entire market value’ rule is the corollary
of apportionment”206—the patentee can recover damages for an

201. Id. at 1332.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1333.
204. Although the entire market value rule is not expressly listed as part of the GeorgiaPacific test, similar considerations are implicated by numerous factors, including Factor 8
(commercial success and popularity of the product made under the patent), Factor 10 (nature
and benefits of the patented invention), Factor 11 (extent and value of use of the patented
invention in the accused product), and Factor 13 (portion of profit from the accused product
that should be credited to the patented invention).
205. Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1336 (quoting TWM Mfg., Inc. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895,
901 (Fed. Cir. 1986)); see also Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1549 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) (en banc) (“We have held that the entire market value rule permits recovery of
damages based on the value of a patentee’s entire apparatus containing several features when
the patent-related feature is the basis for customer demand.” (internal quotations omitted)).
206. H.R. REP. NO. 110-314, at 64 (2007).
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entire product’s value if the patent is the cause for customers to
demand the product.
The entire market value rule originated in Supreme Court cases
involving equitable claims for accounting of an infringer’s profits,
which were available prior to the 1946 Act. For example, in
Garretson v. Clark,207 the Court held that
[w]hen a patent is for an improvement, and not for an entirely
new machine or contrivance, the patentee must show in what
particulars his improvement has added to the usefulness of
the machine or contrivance. He must separate its results distinctly
from those of the other parts, so that the benefits derived
from it may be distinctly seen and appreciated. . . . The
patentee . . . must . . . show, by equally reliable and satisfactory
evidence, that the profits and damages are to be calculated
on the whole machine, for the reason that the entire value of the
whole machine, as a marketable article, is properly and legally
attributable to the patented feature.208

The Federal Circuit first adopted the entire market value rule for
damages based on lost profits.209 Although the entire market value
rule awards a patentee at least some profits due to unpatented
contributions, Mark Lemley has explained that its application
“nonetheless makes a certain amount of sense in lost profits cases
because, if most of the value of the defendant’s product is
attributable to the patentee’s technology, it is reasonable to conclude
that, but for the infringement, the defendant’s customers would have
bought the product from the [patentee] instead.”210
However, in Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co.,211 the Federal Circuit,
sitting en banc, asserted that the entire market value rule also
extended to reasonable royalties,212 a view it has reaffirmed in

207. 111 U.S. 120 (1884).
208. Id. at 121 (emphasis added), quoted in Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1337.
209. See, e.g., Paper Converting Mach. Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp., 745 F.2d 11, 22
(Fed. Cir. 1984).
210. Lemley, supra note 23, at 663; see also Thomas F. Cotter, Patent Holdup, Patent
Remedies, and Antitrust Responses, 34 J. CORP. L. 1151, 1178 n.137 (2009) (arguing that “if
the patentee can prove that the defendant’s infringement caused it to lose sales,” the patentee
should “recover the profits it would have earned on those lost sales”).
211. 56 F.3d 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc).
212. Id. at 1554–55.
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subsequent cases.213 This extension to royalties for complex products
does not make economic sense because a successful claim under the
entire market value means that the patentee is obtaining a royalty
based in part on the “unpatented components of a device . . . that
are part of the same machine.”214 As recent studies have
demonstrated, this leads to an overcompensation of the patentee.215
The entire market value rule is also problematic in cases in which
a reasonable royalty is calculated based on a running royalty. For a
running royalty, the factfinder must determine “two variables: the
royalty base and the royalty rate.”216 The royalty base is the value
base of the products to which the royalty rate is applied.217 Under
the entire market value rule, however, the patentee can claim any
group of products containing the patented technology, no matter
how small a feature or component—for example, an automobile
containing patented windshield wipers218 or a computer containing a
software program with an infringing feature219—as the royalty
base.220 Consequently, a massive damages award can result when a
large royalty base is combined with a royalty rate of “only” a few
percentage points.221 As several prominent high-tech companies,
including Intel, Palm, SAP, and Yahoo!, argued in a recent brief,

213. See, e.g., Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1336–37.
214. Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1549; see also Brian J. Love, Note, Patentee Overcompensation
and the Entire Market Value Rule, 60 STAN. L. REV. 263 (2007) (explaining that “[s]ince
Rite-Hite, courts have frequently applied the entire market value rule to award damages for
components that are unconnected to the infringing element of the accused device, yet which
nevertheless function together with the accused device and are sold or marketed in conjunction
with the infringing article”).
215. Lemley, supra note 23, at 663–64; Love, supra note 214, at 272–84; see also Cotter,
supra note 210, at 1179 n.137 (arguing “that in reasonable royalty cases, the entire market
value rule is conceptually inappropriate”).
216. Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1339 (quoting RAYMOND T. NIMMER & JEFF DODD, MODERN
LICENSING LAW § 7:5 (2008–2009 ed. 2008)).
217. NIMMER & DODD, supra note 216, at § 7:7.
218. Kearns v. Chrysler Corp., 32 F.3d 1541, 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
219. Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1338.
220. Id. at 1338–39; see also Bose Corp. v. JBL, Inc., 274 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (“We have held that the entire market value rule permits recovery of damages based on
the value of a patentee’s entire apparatus containing several features when the patent-related
feature is the basis for customer demand.” (internal quotations and citation omitted)).
221. See, e.g., Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1309, 1338–40 (finding that the royalty rate of 8% on
all copies of Microsoft Outlook led to $358 million damages award by the jury).
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[B]y permitting evidence of the total sales of a complex, multicomponent product, the entire market value rule invites juries to
start their damages calculation with a very large number, which
biases juries toward overcompensatory damages awards. . . . The
likely scenario in such a case is then this: A jury, when presented
with portfolio licensing exemplars under which royalties may be as
high as 5–8% of the licensee’s revenues, will combine these high
rates with evidence showing total sales of a successful, complex
product and reach a conclusion on damages that bears no
reasonable relationship to the value of an individual patented
component.222

Several recent cases illustrate the flaw of applying the entire
market value rule as part of a Georgia-Pacific reasonable royalty
analysis. In Lucent v. Gateway, the patentee’s damages expert
claimed that, under the entire market value rule, the parties would
have agreed to a 1% royalty on the sale of all “infringing computers”
loaded with the software (Microsoft Outlook) that purportedly
contained the patented date-picking feature.223 After the trial court
excluded computer sales as the proper royalty base, the patentee’s
expert changed his opinion to contend that the royalty base should
be the price of the allegedly infringing software but that the royalty
rate should be increased to 8%.224 The jury apparently agreed and
awarded a $358 million royalty for “a very small component of a
much larger software program.”225 On appeal, the Federal Circuit
overturned the verdict, holding that it was not supported by
substantial evidence because there was no evidence that the patented
feature was “the basis—or even a substantial basis—of the consumer
demand for” the software program.226
Similarly, in Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft, the patentee claimed
damages relating to nearly $20 billion in sales of Microsoft’s software
products, including Windows XP and Microsoft Office, which

222. Brief for Ten Amici Curiae Technology-Based Companies in Support of Appellant
Microsoft Corp. at 17–18, Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (No. 2008-1485), 2008 WL 5550592.
223. Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1338.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 1336–37.
226. Id. at 1337 (emphasis added); see also id. (“Lucent did not carry its evidentiary
burden of proving that anyone purchased Outlook because of the patented method.”).
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contained the allegedly infringing product activation system.227 The
patentee’s damages expert opined that a reasonable royalty for the
patented technology was $564 million, and supported this with a
reasonableness “check” that his royalty figure was approximately 3%
of the accused products’ total sales dollar volume.228 Ultimately, the
jury awarded $388 million as a reasonable royalty.229 During posttrial motions, the district court granted Microsoft’s request for a new
trial on damages, finding that the expert’s opinion was an end-run
around the entire market value rule. It noted that the patentee
“conceded customers do not buy Office or Windows because of” the
allegedly infringing product activation feature, and thus could not
base its proposed royalty—even as a check—on the “market value of
the products.”230
D. Balancing the Factors
Furthermore, Georgia-Pacific’s absence of guidance for balancing
the various factors contributes to a lack of certainty and predictability
in reasonable royalty awards. This unpredictability is partially due to
the test’s lengthy list of fifteen nonexclusive factors. Such broad,
multifactor tests have been criticized as being poorly designed and
containing duplicative or overlapping factors, which can lead to
unpredictable results.231
Indeed, there is increasing sentiment among intellectual property
scholars that the Georgia-Pacific test provides juries with inadequate

227. 640 F. Supp. 2d 150, 156, 184 (D.R.I. 2009). Microsoft’s Product Activation
(“PA”) system is a feature “contained in software products sold through retail distribution”
that attempts to prevent software piracy by limiting the number of computers on which
software can be installed in accordance with the software’s end user license agreement. Id. at
156–57. Plaintiff Uniloc claimed that Microsoft’s PA system infringed U.S. Patent No.
5,490,216, which claimed a particular “method of reducing unlicensed use of software
through casual copying.” Id. at 155.
228. Id. at 184–85.
229. Id. at 185. On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s order of a
new trial on damages, explaining that “[t]his case provides a good example of the danger of
admitting consideration of the entire market value of the accused where the patented
component does not create the basis for customer demand.” No. 2010-1035, 2011 WL 9738,
at *24 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 4, 2011).
230. Id. at 184–85.
231. Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench:
How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 41 (2007).
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instruction on how to determine a reasonable royalty. John R.
Thomas recently explained that
[e]xperience suggests that the Georgia-Pacific factors are difficult to
apply consistently. Although Georgia-Pacific provides a long list of
ingredients, it offers no recipe—that is to say, no principles for
deciding whether one of the seemingly randomly ordered elements
should be weighed more heavily than another in a given
determination. The laundry list of Georgia Pacific factors . . .
cannot plausibly be considered to provide a “standard” for setting
reasonable royalty rates at all.232

Similarly, John Schlicher has contended that the key problem
with a reasonable royalty is that “juries are not given useful guidance
on how to apply the so-called Georgia-Pacific factors.”233 And Mark
Lemley and Daralyn Durie argue that Georgia-Pacific’s “nonexclusive fifteen-factor test that requires balancing and consideration
of the interactions between the factors is likely to give little or no
practical guidance to a jury.”234
Similar criticisms were made to the Federal Trade Commission
during a series of hearings in 2009 entitled The Evolving IP
Marketplace. Paul Janicke explained that in practice, Georgia-Pacific
leads to “erratic results” because the test is like a “grab bag” where
“the judge throws the grab bag with all the factors to the jury and
says, ‘Do what you think is right.’”235 As a result, he concluded the
test should be abandoned.236 Likewise, Tom Cotter has observed
that the Georgia-Pacific factors “can be so easily manipulated by the
trier of fact to reach virtually any outcome.”237

232. The Patent Reform Act of 2009: Hearing on H.R. 1260 Before the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 4 (2009) (statement of Prof. John R. Thomas, Georgetown Univ.),
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Thomas090430.pdf.
233. John W. Schlicher, Patent Damages, the Patent Reform Act, and Better Alternatives
for the Courts and Congress, 91 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 19, 22 (2009).
234. Durie & Lemley, supra note 1, at 631.
235. Fed. Trade Comm’n, Hearing on: The Evolving IP Marketplace, Matter No.
P093900, at 15 (Feb. 11, 2009) (testimony of Prof. Paul M. Janicke, Univ. of Hous. L. Ctr.),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/workshops/ipmarketplace/feb11/090211transcript.pdf.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 39 (testimony of Prof. Thomas F. Cotter, Univ. of Minn. L. Sch.).
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A little-noted point about Georgia-Pacific is that the test was
initially created for application by a court, not a jury.238 The district
court’s opinion in that case noted that a “proper conclusion[] . . .
concerning the amount of a reasonable royalty” required “the
exercise of judicial discretion.”239 Like most patent litigation at the
time, Georgia-Pacific was tried by a court. But today, most patent
issues—including damages—are decided by juries instead.240 The
competency of juries to decide complex, lengthy cases has long been
questioned, particularly for difficult scientific and economic issues.241
In contrast, judges are generally perceived as being better trained,
more experienced, and having more time to decide such complex
issues.242 While an assessment of juror competency in patent
litigation is outside the scope of this Article,243 it seems likely that a
lengthy, multifactor test with little instruction on how to balance the
relevant factors, like Georgia-Pacific, would exacerbate the potential
juror competency issue.
In addition, as Mark Lemley and Daralyn Durie have explained,
the imprecise nature of Georgia-Pacific makes it difficult to exclude
expert testimony on a reasonable royalty, even if it seems grossly
disproportionate to the relative value of the patented invention.244
Under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals245 and its progeny,
courts have the duty to act as a “gatekeeper” for proposed expert

238. See, e.g., Durie & Lemley, supra note 1, at 631–32 (explaining that Georgia-Pacific
was decided at a time when nearly all patent cases were tried before a judge).
239. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120–21
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (emphasis added).
240. Moore, supra note 151, at 366.
241. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 150, at 489–95; Martin H. Redish, Seventh Amendment
Right to Jury Trial: A Study in the Irrationality of Rational Decisionmaking, 70 NW. U. L.
REV. 486 (1975); Note, The Jury’s Capacity to Decide Complex Cases, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1489
(1997).
242. Smith, supra note 150, at 489–95.
243. For previous scholarly work on this issue, see generally Jennifer F. Miller, Should
Juries Hear Complex Patent Cases?, 2004 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 4 (2004); Kimberly A.
Moore, Juries, Patent Cases, & A Lack of Transparency, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 779, 780–82
(2002); Davin M. Stockwell, A Jury of One’s (Technically Competent) Peers?, 21 WHITTIER L.
REV. 645 (2000).
244. See Durie & Lemley, supra note 1, at 632 (“The breadth of the available [GeorgiaPacific] factors also means that it is difficult to exclude evidence or expert testimony espousing
virtually any theory of reasonable royalty damages, no matter how outlandish.”).
245. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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testimony to determine if it is sufficiently reliable for admission.246
But because Georgia-Pacific permits the factfinder to consider
virtually all potentially relevant evidence and give it whatever weight
it deems appropriate, it is difficult to establish that an expert’s
reasonable royalty methodology is unreliable, so long as the expert
professes some semblance of adherence to the Georgia-Pacific
framework.247 Thus, experts often “run down the list [of fifteen
Georgia-Pacific factors] and identify some factors that support ‘high’
royalty rates, while others identify those factors that support ‘low’
royalty rates, whichever seems to benefit them most.”248 As a result,
the Georgia-Pacific factors easily can be cherry-picked and
manipulated to justify a large range of potential awards.249
For example, in Cornell University v. Hewlett Packard Co.,
discussed above,250 the parties’ damages experts offered widely
diverging opinions regarding an appropriate royalty award. At trial,
Cornell’s damages expert opined that in a hypothetical negotiation,
the parties would have agreed to a 2.5% royalty rate on the $23
billion market for HP’s servers and workstations containing
computer chips that practiced the patented technology, for a total

246. See id. at 589 (“[T]he trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or
evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.”); see also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,
526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999) (holding that the district court’s “gatekeeping obligation” under
Daubert extends “to all expert testimony,” scientific or otherwise). See generally FED. R. EVID.
702.
247. See, e.g., Micro Chem., Inc. v. Lextron, Inc., 317 F.3d 1387, 1391–93 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (holding that plaintiff’s damages expert’s testimony was reliable because he “properly
applied the accepted Georgia-Pacific methodology to [plaintiff]’s version of the disputed facts,
explaining the effect each factor would have on a negotiated royalty”); Bowling v. Hasbro,
Inc., No. 05-229S, 2008 WL 717741, at *3 (D.R.I. Mar. 17, 2008) (“[T]he Georgia-Pacific
rubric is presumptively reliable in both principle and methodology.”).
248. William Choi & Roy Weinstein, An Analytical Solution to Reasonable Royalty Rate
Calculations, 41 IDEA 49, 51 (2001).
249. See Roy J. Epstein & Alan J. Marcus, Economic Analysis of the Reasonable Royalty:
Simplification and Extension of the Georgia-Pacific Factors, 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC’Y 555, 555 (2003) (“The overriding problem is that the [Georgia-Pacific] factors typically
can be used to justify a very wide range of outcomes.”); see also Hearing on H.R. 1260, supra
note 232, at *4 (asserting that the result of Georgia-Pacific “has been a potpourri of factors
that experts may apply with virtually unlimited discretion”).
250. 609 F. Supp. 2d 279 (N.D.N.Y. 2009); see also supra notes 169–73 and
accompanying text.
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royalty award of $575 million.251 In support of this opinion,
Cornell’s expert relied on numerous Georgia-Pacific factors,
including the royalty rates of other licenses entered into by HP
(Factor 2), the profitability of HP’s servers and workstations (Factor
8), and the claimed advantages of the patented technology (Factors
9–11).252 In contrast, HP’s damages expert offered an opinion that
in a hypothetical negotiation, the parties would have agreed to a
royalty two orders of magnitude lower: approximately $2 million.253
HP’s expert’s opinion was based in significant part on a lump-sum
royalty payment in another patent license HP had entered into for
microprocessor technology (Factor 2).254 Ultimately, the jury’s
verdict “split the baby” and awarded Cornell $184 million as a
reasonable royalty, which it calculated by applying a 0.8% royalty rate
to the $23 billion royalty base for HP’s servers and workstations.255
E. Judicial Review
Last—but not least—the amorphous nature of the GeorgiaPacific test makes it difficult for a jury’s reasonable royalty award to
be adequately reviewed during post-trial motions or on appeal.256
First, juries are almost never required to identify which GeorgiaPacific factors supported their verdict, nor must they explain what
weight was given to any particular factor. Rather, juries are usually
instructed to either (1) identify the applicable royalty rate and total
royalty award257 or (2) simply state the “sum of money” that “would
251. Trial Tr. vol. IV, at 65, May 23, 2008, Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No.
01-CV-01974 (N.D.N.Y.) (testimony of Dr. Marion J. Stewart).
252. Id. at 53–59. Cornell’s expert also claimed that he considered Cornell’s willingness
to license the patent (Factor 4), the remaining duration of patent protection (Factor 7), and
contributions made by HP to the servers and workstations that were not related to the
patented technology (Factor 13). Id. at 55–58.
253. Trial Tr. vol. VIII, at 154–55, May 28, 2008, Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard
Co., No. 01-CV-01974 (N.D.N.Y.) (testimony of John Ostendorf).
254. Id. at 150–55.
255. Cornell Univ., 609 F. Supp. 2d at 282. As previously discussed, after trial, Judge
Rader granted Hewlett-Packard’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on Cornell’s claim
that it was entitled to a royalty on the entire $23 billion market for HP servers and
workstations, and reduced Cornell’s royalty award to approximately $53 million. Id. at 287–
93; see also supra notes 169–73 and accompanying text.
256. See Durie & Lemley, supra note 1, at 632.
257. See, e.g., Revolution Eyewear, Inc. v. Aspex Eyewear, Inc., No. 02-CV-1087-VAP,
2008 WL 6873809, at *2–3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2008); Special Verdict Form at 9, Kowalski v.
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fairly and reasonably compensate” the patentee for the
infringement.258
Second, jury instructions that recite the potpourri of GeorgiaPacific factors tend to make effective post-trial review of reasonable
royalty awards more difficult. During final jury instructions, the
district court typically explains the concept of a reasonable royalty259
and then lists all of the Georgia-Pacific factors, leaving it up to the
jury to evaluate and weigh the evidence and the factors.260 For
example, the official commentary to the Seventh Circuit’s model
instructions emphasizes that the district court “should be sensitive
not to highlight one or more of the [Georgia-Pacific] factors in the
instructions, to avoid any implication that the Court has endorsed
certain of the evidence.”261 Finally, some jury instructions include a

Momma Gina Tuna Res., Nos. 05-00679-BMK et al. (D. Haw. Dec. 12, 2008) (on file with
author); Special Verdict Form at 8–9, Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., Nos. 02-CV-2060
B (CAB) (S.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2007), available at 2007 WL 892887; see also NAT’L JURY
INSTRUCTION PROJECT, MODEL PATENT JURY INSTRUCTIONS, Verdict Form A (requesting
the jury identify the royalty rate and total dollar amount of royalty damages), available at
http://www.nationaljuryinstructions.org/documents/NationalPatentJuryInstructions.pdf.
258. See, e.g., Verdict Form at 2, i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., No. 6:07-CV-113
(E.D. Tex. May 20, 2009) (on file with author); Verdict Form at 31, Creative Internet Adver.
Corp. v Yahoo! Inc., No. 6:07-CV-354 (E.D. Tex. May 15, 2009) (on file with author); see
also Stephen S. Korniczky & Don W. Martens, Verdict Forms – A Peek Into the “Black Box,” 23
AIPLA Q.J. 617, 621 (1995) (explaining that “most federal, jury-tried, civil cases are resolved
by a general verdict,” which “commonly appears as a single statement in a form similar to the
following: ‘We, the jury in the above-entitled action find for the plaintiff and against the
defendant in the amount of $______ dollars’”).
259. See NAT’L JURY INSTRUCTION PROJECT, supra note 257, § 6.6 (2009); AM.
INTELL. PROP. LAW ASS’N, AIPLA MODEL PATENT JURY INSTRUCTIONS
§ 12.15 (2008), available at http://www.aipla.org/Content/ContentGroups/Publications1/
Publications_available_for_viewing1/2008_03_27_AIPLA_Model_Jury_Instructions.pdf;
COMM. ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT, FEDERAL CIVIL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT § 11.4.4 (2009), available at
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/Pattern_Jury_Instr/7th_civ_instruc_2009.pdf.
260. See AIPLA MODEL PATENT JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 259, § 12.16 (“In
determining the value of a reasonable royalty, you may consider evidence on any of the
following [Georgia-Pacific] factors . . . .”); Charge of the Court at 25–27, Creative Internet
Adver. Corp. v. Yahoo! Inc., No. 6:07-CV-354 (E.D. Tex. May 15, 2009) (same). The
Northern District of California’s model patent instruction is a notable exception, as it does not
list any of the Georgia-Pacific factors. MODEL PATENT JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE
NORTHERN
DISTRICT
OF
CALIFORNIA
§
5.7
(2007),
available
at
http://www.cand.uscourts.gov.
261. FEDERAL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT, supra note 259, §
11.4.4 cmt. 2.
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“sixteenth factor” that instruct the jury to consider “any other
economic factor that a normally prudent business person would . . .
take into consideration” during the hypothetical negotiation.262
Based on these broad instructions, it is very difficult for the district
court to determine the factual basis for the jury’s royalty award after
a verdict has been entered. As a result, the court “may be inclined to
simply give up and defer to whatever the jury awards.”263
For example, in the Lucent v. Gateway MP3 litigation, the
district court partially denied Microsoft’s motion for a new trial on
damages after the parties had introduced a plethora of evidence and
damages models under Georgia-Pacific. It held that “absent a view
into the ‘black-box’ of the jury’s decision making process, the Court
cannot say that the jury’s verdict was inconsistent or without the
support of sufficient evidence.”264 Likewise, in Revolution Eyeware,
Inc. v. Aspex Eyeware, Inc., the district court rejected the infringer’s
claim that the jury’s verdict was unsupported by substantial evidence
because the jury could have considered a wide variety of evidence
relevant to the Georgia-Pacific factors.265 It concluded that
“[a]lthough the precise method by which the jury decided the
amount of damages [the patentee] suffered remains unknown . . .
there is sufficient evidence to support the damages awarded.”266
Third, the Federal Circuit’s highly deferential standard of review
toward a jury’s reasonable royalty award means that relatively few
awards are overturned on appeal. The determination of damages
based on a reasonable royalty is a question of fact,267 and the Federal
Circuit has admitted that jury’s reasonable royalty award necessarily
involves some approximation and uncertainty.268 On appeal, a jury’s
damages award “‘must be upheld unless the amount is grossly

262. AIPLA MODEL PATENT JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 259, § 12.16; NAT’L
JURY INSTRUCTION PROJECT, supra note 257, § 6.6.
263. Durie & Lemley, supra note 1, at 632.
264. Lucent Techs, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 509 F. Supp. 2d 912, 940 (S.D. Cal. 2007).
265. Revolution Eyewear, Inc. v. Aspex Eyewear, Inc., No. 02-CV-01087-VAP, 2008
WL 6873809, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2008).
266. Id.
267. SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Lab. Corp., 926 F.2d 1161, 1164 (Fed. Cir.
1991); see also Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 488 F.3d 973, 981 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“In
reviewing damages awards in patent cases, we give broad deference to the conclusions reached
by the finder of fact.”).
268. Monsanto, 488 F.3d at 981.
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excessive or monstrous, clearly not supported by the evidence, or
based only on speculation or guesswork.’”269 Under this permissive
standard, then, it is unsurprising that only a small fraction of
reasonable royalty awards determined under Georgia-Pacific have
been overturned on appeal.270
Recently, however, the Federal Circuit has shown more interest
in scrutinizing the factual support for reasonable royalty awards,
which may result in less deference to juries’ damage determinations.
For example, in September 2009, the Federal Circuit vacated a $511
million award in the Lucent v. Gateway litigation involving Microsoft
Outlook and remanded for a new trial on damages, concluding that
“the jury’s damages award is not supported by substantial evidence,
but is based mainly on speculation or guesswork.”271 In particular,
the court found that many of the previous patent licenses Lucent
relied upon for its proffered royalty calculation were “radically
different from the hypothetical agreement under consideration for
the [patents-in-suit],”272 and that the infringing feature was only “a
tiny feature of one part of a much larger software program.”273
Similarly, in Wordtech Systems, Inc. v. Integrated Network Solutions,
Inc.,274 decided in June 2010, the Federal Circuit held that previous
licenses to the patents-in-suit could not support the jury’s award of
$250,000—which equated to a 26.3% effective royalty rate—to the
plaintiff because some licenses contained insufficient information on
how they were calculated, and the remaining ones had much lower

269. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(quoting Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 1580 (Fed. Cir.
1992)); see also i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 857 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(“Asking whether a damages award is ‘reasonable,’ ‘grossly excessive or monstrous,’ ‘based
only on speculation or guesswork,’ or ‘clearly not supported by the evidence,’ are simply
different ways of asking whether the jury’s award is supported by the evidence.” (citations
omitted)).
270. See Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1336 (“Most jury [patent] damages awards reviewed on
appeal have been held to be supported by substantial evidence.”); Durie & Lemley, supra note
1, at 633–34 (finding a 72% to 77% affirmance rate by the Federal Circuit for reasonable
royalty damage awards).
271. Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1332, 1335.
272. Id. at 1327. Indeed, Lucent conceded on appeal that “‘none of the real world
licenses introduced at trial arose from circumstances identical to those presumed to prevail in
the hypothetical royalty negotiation.’” Id. at 1329 (citation omitted).
273. Id. at 1332.
274. 609 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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running royalty rates of 3–6%.275 This increased scrutiny of jury
awards is a welcome trend, but it is unlikely to solve the inherent
malleability of the Georgia-Pacific standard by itself.
V. THE COST OF AN ACCEPTABLE NONINFRINGING SUBSTITUTE
SHOULD SERVE AS A CEILING ON A REASONABLE ROYALTY AWARD
In lieu of Georgia-Pacific, this Article proposes that courts
should adopt an alternative standard for imposing a reasonable
royalty: when an acceptable noninfringing substitute for the patented
technology exists, the cost of that substitute should serve as a
“ceiling” on a reasonable royalty.
A. The Role of Acceptable Noninfringing Substitutes in the
Hypothetical Negotiation
As the Supreme Court explained in Aro Manufacturing Co. v.
Convertible Top Replacement Co. (“Aro II”),276 the proper measure
of “damages” under § 284 is “the difference between [the
patentee’s] pecuniary condition after the infringement, and what his
condition would have been if the infringement had not occurred.”277
This “but for” inquiry “requires a reconstruction of the market, as it
would have developed absent the infringing product, to determine
what the patentee would have made.”278
A key consideration in this ex ante market reconstruction is what
“alternative actions the infringer foreseeably would have undertaken
had he not infringed.”279 As previously explained, in the hypothetical
negotiation framework, the hypothetical licensee would have three
options—to infringe, to take a license to the patent, or to forego use
of the patented technology.280 The hypothetical negotiation assumes

275. Id. at 1319–21; see also ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860, 868 (Fed.
Cir. 2010) (vacating and remanding a district court’s reasonable royalty award because it relied
on “speculative and unreliable evidence divorced from proof of economic harm linked to the
claimed invention”).
276. 377 U.S. 476 (1964).
277. Id. at 507 (quoting Yale Lock Mfg. Co. v. Sargent, 117 U.S. 536, 552 (1886))
(quotation marks omitted).
278. Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 185 F.3d 1341, 1350 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (internal quotations, citation, and ellipses omitted).
279. Id. at 1350–51.
280. See supra Part III.B.
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the second option—that the licensee would agree to a license.
However, the third option looms large in determining the outer
bounds of what the hypothetical licensee would have agreed to pay
for such a license.
In a hypothetical negotiation, a rational prospective licensee
would consider the “Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement”
(BATNA)—that is, the best result that can be obtained if the
negotiation fails to reach an agreement.281 A licensee’s BATNA
represents its “walk-away value”: the maximum it would be willing
to pay for a license to the patented technology.282 Thus, a
hypothetical negotiation necessarily “occurs in the shadow of the
alternative.”283 In many cases, in lieu of paying for a license, the best
alternative may be adoption of a substitute noninfringing
technology.
For example, in Grain Processing Corp. v. American MaizeProducts Co., the Federal Circuit explained that “an accurate
reconstruction of the hypothetical ‘but for’ market” should “take[]
into account any [noninfringing] alternatives” to the patented
technology that would be “available to the infringer.”284 In that case,
the patentee, Grain Processing, owned a patent that claimed a type
of maltodextrins—a family of food additives made from starch—and
processes for producing them.285 The defendant, American MaizeProducts, was accused of infringing Grain Processing’s patented
process for over a decade using three different manufacturing
processes.286 After being informed that its third process allegedly
infringed the patent, American Maize-Products implemented a new
process, called Process IV, within two weeks (a period called

281. FISHER, URY & PATTON, supra note 95, at 99–100.
282. See Lisa B. Bingham, Control Over Dispute-System Design and Mandatory
Commercial Arbitration, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2004, at 221, 233.
283. Id.; see also Eric Keller, Time-Varying Compulsory License: Facilitating License
Negotiation for Efficient Post-Verdict Patent Infringement, 16 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 427,
440 (2008) (“The value that a patentee can demand in licensing negotiations is limited by the
cost of the infringer’s Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement, or BATNA.”).
284. Grain Processing, 185 F.3d at 1351.
285. Id. at 1343–44. Although not a commonly known ingredient, the market for
maltodextrins is quite large—the Federal Circuit noted that commercial food manufacturers
use hundreds of millions of pounds of maltodextrins annually in a wide variety of food
products, including drinks, syrups, frostings, cereals, and frozen foods. Id.
286. Id. at 1345–47.
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“practically instantaneous” for large-scale production by the district
court).287
In litigation, Grain Processing asked for lost profits or,
alternatively, a reasonable royalty. The district court rejected the lost
profits claims, finding that the alternative noninfringing process
implemented by American Maize-Products meant Grain Processing
could not recover lost profits under the Panduit test.288 Grain
Products appealed this determination, and the Federal Circuit
affirmed, holding that Process IV was an acceptable, noninfringing
substitute during the entire damages period.289 The Federal Circuit
explained that a comparison of the “patented invention to its nextbest available alternative(s)—regardless of whether the alternative(s)
were actually produced and sold during the infringement”—would
permit the factfinder to discern “the market value of the patent
owner’s exclusive right.”290 Thus, “[t]he availability of substitutes
invariably will influence the market forces defining this ‘but for’
marketplace.”291
Although lost profits were at issue in the Grain Processing
decision, its logic is equally applicable in the reasonable royalty
context.292 As the district court decision in Georgia-Pacific explained,
a hypothetical negotiation for a reasonable royalty must account for
“the realities of the bargaining table.”293 Confronted with an
“unreasonably high license fee for patented technology,” a rational

287. Id. at 1346.
288. Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 893 F. Supp. 1386, 1390–93
(N.D. Ind. 1995), aff’d in part, vacated in part by 108 F.3d 1392 (Fed. Cir. 1997). The
district court also rejected Grain Processing’s proposed royalty of 28% of American MaizeProducts’ revenue from sales of the infringing product, awarding a 3% royalty due to its costs
savings from the patented technology. Id. at 1392–93.
289. 185 F.3d at 1352–55.
290. Id. at 1351.
291. Id. at 1356.
292. See, e.g., Ned L. Conley, An Economic Approach to Patent Damages, 15 AIPLA Q.J.
354, 384 (1987) (“[T]he existence or non-existence of a non-infringing alternative is as
important a factor in determining the amount of a reasonable royalty as it is in determining
whether lost profits will be awarded.”).
293. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1122 (S.D.N.Y.
1970).
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licensee would “ordinarily opt for [a] noninfringing alternative[].”294
Thus, when both parties are aware—as required by the rules of the
hypothetical negotiation—that the prospective licensee can “walk
away” from the bargaining table and adopt a substitute at a lower
cost than the royalty demanded by the patentee, this threat can be a
powerful one. In such a hypothetical negotiation, “the defendant
will have a good argument as to why it would not pay much to
license a patent . . . the defendant could simply ‘go across the street’
and use that technology, rather than [the] plaintiff’s.”295
Several Federal Circuit decisions suggest that it might extend
Grain Processing to reasonable royalties, although it has not expressly
done so.296 For example, in Zygo Corp. v. Wyko Corp.,297 the Federal
Circuit vacated and remanded a lost profits award in light of the
defendant’s claim that an acceptable noninfringing alternative
existed.298 The court also vacated and remanded for determination of
a reasonable royalty on similar grounds, explaining that in a
hypothetical negotiation, the accused infringer “would have been in
a stronger position to negotiate for a lower royalty rate knowing it
had a competitive noninfringing device ‘in the wings.’”299 Likewise,
in Riles v. Shell Exploration & Production Co.,300 the Federal Circuit
vacated a reasonable royalty award for damages associated with an
infringing method of anchoring an offshore drilling platform without
using mud mats. It held that the patentee’s damages expert’s model
was flawed because it attempted to claim a royalty on the entire
offshore platform, rather than the incremental benefit of anchoring
offshore oil rigs without mud mats.301 It explained that “in the
hypothetical negotiation that characterizes the reasonable royalty
calculation, [the accused infringer] may have had non-infringing

294. Total Containment, Inc. v. Environ Prods., Inc., 1997 WL 16032, at *7 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (citing State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir.
1989) (en banc)).
295. CAULEY, supra note 32, at 104.
296. Micro Chem., Inc. v. Lextron, Inc., 317 F.3d 1387, 1393 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
297. 79 F.3d 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
298. Id. at 1571–72.
299. Id.
300. 298 F.3d 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
301. Id. at 1312.
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alternatives to installing with temporary pilings.”302 Thus, the Federal
Circuit held, “under the constraints of the hypothetical negotiation,
the market could not award [the patentee] a royalty for his method
divorced of all relation to a potential noninfringing alternative
method. The economic relationship between the patented method
and noninfringing alternative methods, of necessity, would limit the
hypothetical negotiation.”303
B. What is an “Acceptable” Substitute?
One key issue under this Article’s proposed standard is whether a
potential substitute constitutes an “acceptable” replacement for the
patented technology. If there is no acceptable noninfringing
substitute for the patented technology, at least for some customers,
then the hypothetical licensee cannot negotiate a lower royalty rate
by threatening to forego a license and switch to another technology.
The Federal Circuit’s decisions on acceptable noninfringing
alternatives in the lost profits context provide some guidance on this
question. As previously explained, to recover lost profits under the
Panduit test, the patentee must establish “an absence of acceptable
noninfringing substitutes.”304 For this requirement, the Federal
Circuit has held that “[c]onsumer demand defines the relevant
market and relative substitutability among products therein.”305
Important facts relevant to this determination include the “similarity
of physical and functional attributes of the patentee’s product” to
the alleged substitute, “consumers’ intended use for the patentee’s
product,” and the price of the alleged substitute compared to the
patented technology.306 These requirements “ensure[] that any
proffered alternative competes in the same market for the same
customers as the infringer’s product.”307

302. Id.
303. Id. (citing Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 185 F.3d 1341, 1347
(Fed. Cir. 1999)).
304. Cohesive Techs., Inc. v. Waters Corp., 543 F.3d 1351, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(quoting Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v. Gencor Indus., Inc., 953 F.2d 1360, 1373 (Fed. Cir.
1991)).
305. Grain Processing, 185 F.3d at 1355.
306. Id. (citing Fonar Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 107 F.3d 1543, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
307. BIC Leisure Prods., Inc. v. Windsurfing Int’l., Inc., 1 F.3d 1214, 1219 (Fed. Cir.
1993).
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Some Federal Circuit decisions go even further, however, and
attempt to draw a bright line between acceptable and non-acceptable
substitutes. Under these decisions, to be “acceptable,” “the alleged
alternative ‘must not have a disparately higher price than or possess
characteristics significantly different from the patented’”
technology.308 A common refrain is that “[a] product lacking the
advantages of that patented can hardly be termed a substitute
‘acceptable’ to the customer who wants those advantages.”309
The latter definition of an “acceptable” substitute is likely too
narrow to be useful, because unpatented substitutes often do not
have the exact attributes or qualities as validly patented inventions.310
Rather, “[i]n real markets for actual products, substitution is a
matter of degree” because “[s]ome, but not all, customers will
substitute a product without the patented technology for one with
the technology.”311 Moreover, the bright-line approach is
inconsistent with economic theory, which explains that even
imperfect substitutes can constrain the exercise of market power by a
patentee. As Judge Easterbrook has explained, “[c]ompetition is not
an all-or-none process. There are degrees of substitutability.”312
Thus, the value of “[p]atented items in an imperfect, but still
competitive, market will be restrained . . . depending on the degree
to which substitutes are functionally equivalent.”313 When there are
“close substitutes for the patented product, competition from these
substitutes would restrain the patent holder’s potential . . . royalty he

308. Id. (quoting Kaufman Co., Inc. v. Lantech, Inc., 926 F.2d 1136, 1142 (Fed. Cir.
1991)).
309. TWM Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 901–02 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(quoting Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1162 (6th Cir.
1978)); see also Stryker Corp. v. Intermedics Orthopedics, Inc., 96 F.3d 1409, 1418 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (holding that a “‘product on the market which lacks the advantages of the patented
product can hardly be termed a[n] [acceptable] substitute’” (quoting Standard Havens, 953
F.2d at 1373)).
310. Paul M. Janicke, Contemporary Issues in Patent Damages, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 691,
701 (1993).
311. Vincent E. O’Brien, Economics and Key Patent Damages Cases, 9 U. BALT. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 1, 6 (2000).
312. In re Mahurkar Double Lumen Litig., 831 F. Supp. 1354, 1389–90 (N.D. Ill.
1993), aff’d, 71 F.3d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
313. Sean Flynn et al., An Economic Justification for Open Access to Essential Medicine
Patents in Developing Countries, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 184, 186 n.13 (2009).
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could charge.”314 Thus, competition from imperfect substitutes is
weak enough to “allow the patent holder to raise price above cost or
charge some royalty, but strong enough so the patent holder’s
optimal price or royalty is less than the monopoly price or
royalty.”315 The price and capabilities of the imperfect substitute play
an important role in determining the premium that a patent holder
can charge for its own product.316 In sum, a “bright-line” test for
substitutability ignores the reality that often “product substitution is
a matter of degree and occurs across a spectrum.”317
For an example of imperfect substitutes, consider the various
versions of the iPhone. The first iPhone, released in mid-2007,
supported Internet access over either a local Wi-Fi network or a wide
area cellular network using GSM or EDGE, both second-generation
(2G) wireless data technologies.318 The iPhone 3G, introduced in
2008, included support for third-generation (3G) wireless data,319
with a download speed up to ten times faster than 2G.320 Its
successor, the iPhone 3GS, includes (among other things) an
enhanced version of the 3G standard321 and a processor that is
purportedly up to two times faster than the one in the iPhone 3G.322
And finally, the most recent model, the iPhone 4, included an

314. John D. Culbertson & Roy Weinstein, Product Substitutes and the Calculation of
Patent Damages, 70 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 749, 750 (1988).
315. Id. at 749–50.
316. See ROGER D. BLAIR & THOMAS F. COTTER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
ECONOMIC AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 214 (2005) (“Whether one
product substitutes for another depends not only upon the function of the two products, but
also upon the prices at which they are offered to the public.”).
317. O’Brien, supra note 311, at 7.
318. Wikipedia, iPhone, (Jan. 8, 2011 4:47 AM), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IPhone.
319. Id.
320. See Macworld, The iPhone 3G: What You Need To Know, June 17, 2008, available at
http://www.macworld.com/article/133988/2008/07/iphone3gfaqs.html (last modified
July 9, 2008, 1:13 PM) (stating that iPhone 3G has “typical download speeds as high as
1.4Mbps versus average data speeds between 75Kbps and 135Kpbs on its EDGE network”).
321. Wikipedia, List of iPhone and iPod Touch Models, (Jan. 7, 2011, 10:30 AM)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_iPhone_and_iPod_Touch_models
(iPhone
3GS
supported 7.2 Mbps HSDPA standard).
322. Apple, Inc., iPhone – View All the Features of the new iPhone 3GS,
http://www.apple.com/iphone/iphone-3gs (last visited Jan. 7, 2011).
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improved display and a high-definition (HD) video camera for video
calling, among other features.323
In reality, some customers would consider the older version(s) of
the iPhone to be an “acceptable” substitute to the new iPhone 4,
particularly when an older model is offered at half the cost (or
less).324 Under the Federal Circuit’s rigid definition of substitutes,
however, the earlier iPhone models could not be considered
“acceptable” because they did not offer all the same advantages as
the iPhone 4—even though the older models are capable of
performing many of the same functions, such as retrieving and
reading email, surfing the Internet, playing music and video, and
using apps, just at a lower speed. Thus, for a reasonable royalty,
imperfect substitutes should be evaluated as potentially “acceptable”
alternatives as well.
C. The Costs of Adopting an Acceptable Noninfringing Substitute
The cost to acquire an acceptable noninfringing substitute, along
with any relevant “changeover” costs such as implementation costs
and lost profits due to delay, represents the maximum royalty a
rational licensee would agree to pay for the patented technology.325
As discussed above, the hypothetical negotiation must consider
alternatives to infringement, including the licensee’s potential
adoption of a noninfringing substitute. A rational licensee would not
agree to pay more to use an infringing technology than the costs
(including lost profits) it would expect to incur by using the next

323. Apple, Inc., iPhone 4 – Video Calls, Multitasking, HD Video, and More,
http://www.apple.com/iphone (last visited Jan. 7, 2011). Some features of the iPhone 4,
such as multitasking, are available on older versions of the iPhone through an update to
iPhone’s operating system. Id.
324. See Apple, Inc., iPhone – Compare iPhone 4S and iPhone 3GS,
http://www.apple.com/iphone/compare-iphones (last visited Jan. 7, 2011) ($99 list price for
iPhone 3GS (8 GB storage) with two-year service agreement, compared to $199 (16 GB
storage) or $299 (32 GB storage) for iPhone 4); see also BLAIR & COTTER, supra note 316, at
214 (explaining that “an infringer who could have used an alternative that some consumers
would have viewed as an adequate substitute for the patented invention would have siphoned
off some sales from the patent owner”).
325. See Blair & Cotter, supra note 69, at 59 (explaining that in a real negotiation, “the
infringer would have agreed to a royalty equal to no more than the amount he could have
expected to earn from using a non-infringing alternative”).
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best noninfringing alternative. As explained by John Schlicher, a
reasonable royalty
requires consideration of the extent to which the potential licensee
had available to it an alternative noninfringing product that it could
make and sell without a license, and the profits the licensee could
make using that alternative. No prudent potential licensee would
pay for a license an amount greater than the difference between the
profits it could earn employing the licensed invention and the
profits it could earn employing the next best noninfringing
alternative to it, and a prudent licensor will recognize this aspect of
the relative bargaining positions of the parties.326

For a substitute that confers the same benefits as the patented
technology, this cost is expressed mathematically below, where LP
represents the licensing fee for the patented technology, CA
represents the costs to acquire or obtain the noninfringing
substitute, and CS represents the “switching” costs related to
adopting the noninfringing substitute:
LP ≤ CA + CS
CA varies depending on the nature of the noninfringing
substitute. For technology that is already available in the public
domain—for example, because patent protection was never obtained
or has expired, or the technology is not patentable because it is an
obvious improvement over the prior art327—the acquisition cost
usually will be minimal.328 Some substitutes, however, may be
patented or otherwise protected (for instance, copyrighted software)
by a third party and thus might require a substantial licensing fee to
the rights-holder.329
326. JOHN W. SCHLICHER, PATENT LAW, LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES § 1:96
(2d ed. 2009).
327. For a discussion of the various uses of the public domain in intellectual property law,
see Edward Lee, The Public’s Domain: The Evolution of Legal Restraints on the Government’s
Power to Control Public Access Through Secrecy or Intellectual Property, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 91,
100–19 (2003).
328. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964) (“[An]
unpatentable article, like an article on which the patent has expired, is in the public domain
and may be made and sold by whoever chooses to do so.”).
329. See, e.g., Spectralytics, Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 650 F. Supp. 2d 900, 907–08 (D.
Minn. 2009) (defendant asserted that a reasonable royalty should be capped at $1.688 million,
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A third possibility is a substitute developed, or easily able to be
developed, by the alleged infringer. In this situation, the acquisition
costs would be the accused infringer’s cost to develop the
substitute.330 For example, in Grain Processing, American Maize
developed a noninfringing substitute (Process IV) to the patented
process in a relatively short time period (two weeks).331 Similarly, in
Zygo Corp. v. Wyko Corp., before introducing the accused
interferometer, the defendant, Wyko, had sold an allegedly
acceptable noninfringing alternative.332 Wyko argued that in the “but
for” market, it would have continued to sell the noninfringing
alternative.333
CS represents the “switching” costs associated with the accused
infringer’s switch to a noninfringing substitute shortly before the
time of first infringement. For example, “the defendant might have
substantial ‘retooling’ costs” associated with implementing the
noninfringing substitute.334 In addition, it might lose expected
profits for the time that it switches to a new product. For instance, if
the defendant in Grain Processing had required $2 million in
expenditures and a two-month delay to implement its new,
noninfringing substitute manufacturing process, the “switching”
costs would include both the $2 million and the lost profits from
sales of maltodextrin during the delay.
In addition, a third variable may be involved if the noninfringing
substitute does not confer all of the same benefits as the patented
technology. For instance, if a noninfringing substitute required a

which represented the cost of a modified machine offered by a third party as a noninfringing
alternative); see also Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1222–23 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (holding that a licensed product is an acceptable noninfringing alternative to patented
technology).
330. See Culbertson & Weinstein, supra note 314, at 756 (“In determining the
appropriate royalty rate, it is also necessary to consider the cost of designing around the patent,
since no competitor is likely to negotiate a royalty rate that produces payments substantially
greater than the design-around cost.”).
331. Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 185 F.3d 1341, 1346–47 (Fed.
Cir. 1999).
332. Zygo Corp. v. Wyko Corp., 79 F.3d 1563, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
333. Id.
334. CAULEY, supra note 32, at 105; see also Hausman, Leonard & Sidak, supra note 2,
at 832 (“An important consideration is whether there exist any noninfringing ‘design-arounds’
and the costs of implementing and using those design-arounds as compared to using the
patented technology.”).
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2.3% greater marginal cost of production compared to the patented
technology,335 this represents an additional cost to the hypothetical
licensee that it would be willing to hypothetically pay for the
patented technology. Thus, accounting for the incremental benefit
of the patented invention compared to the noninfringing
substitute—which is represented by BP—would be expressed as
follows:
LP ≤ CA + CS + BP
Thus, a reasonable royalty award should be effectively “capped”
by the sum of the cost to acquire an acceptable noninfringing
substitute (CA); the costs associated with implementing the
substitute (CS); and the marginal benefit, if any, conferred by the
patented technology over the substitute (BP).
As an illustration, assume that in a hypothetical negotiation, the
patentee (P) demanded a lump-sum royalty of $25 million for
indefinite use of the patented technology. Shortly before first
infringement, however, the accused infringer (AI) could internally
develop an acceptable substitute for a cost of $3 million (CA) in one
month. This one-month delay, however, would push back the
introduction of AI’s new product, resulting in projected lost profits
of $6 million. In addition, AI would incur a cost of an additional $1
million to implement the substitute technology in its new products,
resulting in CS = $7 million. If the substitute technology offered the
same benefits as the patent technology (and thus BP = 0), the rational
licensee would offer only $10 million (CA + CS) as a royalty in the
hypothetical negotiation. Knowing that AI had an equally-good
substitute that it could adopt for $10 million, P would have no
choice but to accept this amount as a royalty.
If it is further assumed that the noninfringing alternative is an
imperfect substitute for the patented technology, however, this also
must be taken into account. For example, assume that because it is
incorporating an imperfect substitute, AI must charge a slightly
lower price for its new product, resulting in projected lost profits of

335. See, e.g., Grain Processing Corp., 893 F. Supp. at 1354 (affirming the district court’s
finding that the patented technology conferred approximately a 2.3% reduction in costs
compared to the noninfringing Process IV).
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an additional $10 million over the product’s lifespan (BP). As a
result, AI would be willing to pay P a total of $20 million (CA + CS +
BP) as a lump sum license.
Recently, in Mars, Inc. v. Coin Acceptors, Inc.,336 the Federal
Circuit suggested that reasonable royalty damages should not be
capped at the cost of a noninfringing alternative. This decision,
however, is unconvincing. In Mars, the plaintiff brought an action
against defendant Coin Acceptors (“Coinco”) for infringement of
two patents covering vending machine coin changers.337 On the
reasonable royalty issue, the district court imposed a 7% blended
royalty rate for both patents during the damages period.338 Coinco
challenged this royalty on several grounds, including “that the
district court erred by awarding a reasonable royalty rate higher than
the cost to Coinco of implementing acceptable noninfringing
alternatives.”339 The Federal Circuit held that “no available and
acceptable noninfringing alternative” to the patents existed at the
time of the hypothetical negotiation.340
In a brief paragraph of dicta following this holding, the court
also stated that “even if Coinco had shown that it had an acceptable
noninfringing alternative at the time of the hypothetical negotiation,
Coinco is wrong as a matter of law to claim that reasonable royalty
damages are capped at the cost of implementing the cheapest
available, acceptable, noninfringing alternative.”341 Citing Monsanto
Co. v. Ralph,342 the court summarily stated that it had “previously
considered and rejected such an argument.”343 However, the
Monsanto decision did not involve consideration of noninfringing
alternatives. Instead, in Monsanto, the court merely refused to
overturn the jury’s award based on the Georgia-Pacific factors,
finding that it was not “grossly excessive or monstrous, clearly not
supported by the evidence, or based only on speculation or

336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
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527 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Id. at 1362–63.
Id. at 1372.
Id.
Id. at 1373.
Id.
382 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Mars, Inc., 527 F.3d at 1373.
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guesswork.”344 Moreover, the Mars decision did not refer to the
Federal Circuit’s previous ruling in Grain Processing, the leading
authority on noninfringing alternatives, nor did it mention Riles,
which strongly suggested that noninfringing alternatives also played
a critical role in the reasonable royalty context.
Subsequent courts should decline to follow the Mars decision’s
dicta on noninfringing substitutes. It is inconsistent with the
Supreme Court’s decision in Aro II—which has been repeatedly
relied upon by the Federal Circuit—that “the statutory measure of
‘damages’ is ‘the difference between [the patent owner’s] pecuniary
condition after the infringement, and what his condition would have
been if the infringement had not occurred.’”345 As explained in
Grain Processing, this requires an analysis based on “sound economic
proof” and “likely outcomes with infringement factored out of the
economic picture,” including the adoption of “any alternatives
available to the infringer.”346 As explained above, no rational
hypothetical licensee would agree to pay more than the expected
cost of an acceptable noninfringing substitute for the patent—
especially in the face of an unreasonably high licensing demand. The
Federal Circuit’s dicta in Mars thus flies in the face of sound
economic analysis and could result in overcompensation of
patentees.
D. A Ceiling Based on Acceptable Noninfringing Substitutes Will Not
Undercompensate Patentees by Granting a “Free Option” to Infringe
One potential criticism of this Article’s proposed approach to
calculating reasonable royalty damages is that it may result in the
undercompensation of patentees. Specifically, proponents of the
status quo may argue that it gives a “free option” to the infringer,
where the infringer has the choice to use the patented technology
and risk litigation. If found to infringe, the infringer can then argue
“that it would have switched to the noninfringing technology in the

344. 382 F.3d at 1383 (quoting Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977
F.2d 1555, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
345. See, e.g., Riles v. Shell Exploration & Prod. Co., 298 F.3d 1302, 1311 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (alteration in original) (quoting Aro II, 377 U.S. 476, 507 (1964)).
346. Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 185 F.3d 1341, 1350–51 (Fed.
Cir. 1999).
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but-for world, thereby effectively making the switch retroactively.”347
The infringer would then pay no more than the cost than it would
have incurred if it had decided to originally implement the
substitute.348 In this situation, “[t]he infringer would have nothing
to lose, and everything to gain if he could count on paying only the
normal, routine royalty noninfringers might have paid. As said by
this court in another context, the infringer would be in a ‘heads-Iwin, tails-you-lose’ position.”349 According to this argument, this
“free option” for infringement “reduces the deterrent effect of
litigation and thereby encourages infringement.”350
In reality, however, undercompensation of patentees due to a
“free option” for infringement is unlikely for several reasons. First,
when an infringer knows about a patent and then deliberately
decides to infringe it, there is a significant possibility that the
infringer will be held liable for willful infringement, resulting in
enhanced damages.351 Section 284 grants the district court discretion
to “increase the damages up to three times the amount found or
assessed” by the jury or court.352 “A finding of willful infringement is
a prerequisite to the award of enhanced damages.”353 Under In re
Seagate,354 to recover enhanced damages, the patentee must establish
that (1) the accused infringer was aware of the patent, (2) the
accused infringer acted despite an “objectively high likelihood” that
its actions infringed a valid patent, and (3) this “objectively high
likelihood” was either known or should have been obvious to the
accused infringer.355 In the preceding scenario, requirement (1) is
easily met because the infringer had actual knowledge of the patent.
Requirements (2) and (3) also may be satisfied because the patentee
had actual knowledge that it was practicing the patent’s claims,
347. Hausman, Leonard & Sidak, supra note 2, at 830 (emphasis omitted).
348. Id. at 830–31.
349. Stickle v. Heublein, Inc., 716 F.2d 1550, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (citing Panduit
Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1158 (6th Cir. 1978)).
350. Hausman, Leonard & Sidak, supra note 2, at 831.
351. See Love, supra note 89, at 926 (explaining that “an infringer making the deliberate
decision to misappropriate patented technology and force litigation rather than paying for an
ex ante license [] would almost certainly qualify as a willful infringer”).
352. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000).
353. i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 858 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
354. In re Seagate Techs., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
355. Id. at 1370–72.
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although the infringer could still argue that there was not an
“objectively high likelihood” because, for example, it had an opinion
from counsel that the patent was invalid.356 The threat of triple
damages is thus a significant deterrent to an infringer’s decision to
exercise a “free option” to infringe.
Second, in addition to a willfulness finding, the accused infringer
may also be held liable for attorney’s fees. Under § 285, “[t]he court
in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the
prevailing party.”357 A case may be considered “exceptional” when
the infringer’s conduct was willful.358 This authorization for
attorneys’ fees is intended to serve as a “deterrent[] to blatant, blind,
willful infringement of valid patents,”359 such as the “free option”
described above. This deterrent can be quite substantial as well—a
recent study found that when the amount at risk was between $1
million and $25 million, the average cost of patent litigation was
approximately $3.1 million.360 When the amount at risk exceeded
$25 million, the average cost of litigation jumped to $6.25
million.361
Third, if the patentee offers (or has attempted to introduce) a
competing product for sale against the infringer’s product, then it
may obtain an alternative measure of relief, rather than relying on a
reasonable royalty award. As previously explained, lost profits are
available if the patentee can demonstrate that it would have lost sales
but for the defendant’s infringement under the Panduit test.362
Furthermore, a patentee may be able to obtain injunctive relief under
§ 283.363 Under eBay Inc. v. MercExchange,364 a patentee who

356. See, e.g., Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Group, Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (holding that “a ‘competent opinion of counsel’ concluding either that [the accused
infringer] did not infringe the [] patent or that [the patent] was invalid would provide a
sufficient basis for [the accused infringer] to proceed without engaging in objectively reckless
behavior”).
357. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000).
358. E.g., Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int’l, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed.
Cir. 2005).
359. Mathis v. Spears, 857 F.2d 749, 754 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
360. AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2009 at I-129
(2009).
361. Id.
362. See supra Part III.A.
363. 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2000).
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prevails in an infringement suit is no longer automatically entitled to
a permanent injunction. Rather, a permanent injunction is within the
discretion of the district court and depends on a number of equitable
factors, including whether the patentee has suffered an irreparable
injury, whether other remedies are inadequate to compensate for the
infringement, whether the balance of hardships in granting the
injunction favors the patentee, and whether the public interest would
be disserved by an injunction.365 But even after eBay, studies have
shown that permanent injunctions have been granted in a majority of
cases when they have been requested by a patentee in a successful
infringement suit.366 In fact, “[t]here is a strong, almost perfect,
correlation between competition between the parties and injunctive
relief.”367 Thus, lost profits and injunctive relief are also significant
deterrents to a “free option” to infringe in many cases.
VI. CONCLUSION
After almost forty years, the Georgia-Pacific test for determining
reasonable royalty damages has outlived its usefulness. The
assortment of nonexclusive factors in the test have proven difficult
for juries to apply, particularly in the context of sophisticated
products like computers, smartphones, and other items that embody
a variety of technology. In addition, Georgia-Pacific prevents judges
from effectively performing their “gatekeeping” role under Daubert
to screen out unreliable—and even unreasonable—proposed expert
testimony regarding a reasonable royalty, as well as adequately
reviewing jury awards to determine if they are truly supported by the
evidence. Ultimately, a standard that grants the jury almost limitless
discretion to award damages, as Georgia-Pacific does, is really no
meaningful standard at all.

364. 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
365. Id. at 391–92.
366. See Benjamin Peterson, Injunctive Relief in the Post-eBay World, 23 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 193, 196–97 (2008) (finding that permanent injunctions were granted in 24 of 33
cases in the two years after eBay); Docket Navigator, Success Rates for Permanent Injunctions
after eBay v. MercExchange (Nov. 20, 2009, 3:33 PM), http://docketreport.blogspot.com/
2009/11/success-rates-for-permanent-injunction.html (finding that from Jan. 2008 to Nov.
2009, district courts granted permanent injunctions in 58 out of 93 requests).
367. Peterson, supra note 365, at 194.
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When there is an acceptable noninfringing substitute to the
patented technology, a more economically appropriate royalty would
be based on the costs of the substitute. Specifically, the cost to the
infringer of adopting and implementing an acceptable noninfringing
substitute, plus any incremental benefit provided by the patented
technology vis-à-vis the substitute, represents the true economic
value of the patent over the prior art. As a result, the cost of the
noninfringing substitute represents the maximum amount a rational
licensee would have agreed to pay in a hypothetical negotiation.
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